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Abstract
In economics, human decision-making models are based on the utility, or happiness, a person experiences
from the choices they make. Individual happiness is closely tied to societal and global well-being, a
common political and and research goal. Psychological studies on happiness show that people generally
return to an average level of happiness after experiencing a significant positive or negative change in their
life, a process known as the “hedonic treadmill.” Empirically, it is often difficult for people to predict the
specific utility they will experience from a given choice, leading them to maintain constant preferences for
only frequently experienced options. This study relies on recent utility models that describe the adaptive
learning process observed in human behavior, where people become better over time at making accurate
judgements for familiar choices. I study whether participants adhere to principles of an adaptive utility
model in an economics lab experiment. Subjects rank many possible payoffs into four categories of
desirability in repeated rounds, thereby determining thresholds of utility. The limitation of four categories
forces participants to optimize how they distinguish between payoffs. Pairs of payoffs are randomly
selected, and then the participant’s ranking is used to determine which of the two payoffs is used for
payment. Changing the frequency at which specific pairs are selected tests the rate of adaptation in
participant rankings, thereby testing a core prediction of the model. Participants in the study adapt over
the course of the game and get closer to the optimal strategy as they play. Results from this study suggest
that people adapt typically only after several repeated rounds of information or after incurring a loss, and
that receiving payoffs in one portion of their utility curve may result in adaptation in the rankings of both
observed and unobserved payoffs with other amounts of utility.
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1. Introduction
Economics traditionally studies scarcity and the choices made in response to said scarcity.
Analyses conducted on both micro and macro levels require an in-depth understanding of human behavior.
Expectations of risk and reward inform both individual and public decision-making as people attempt to
maximize the benefit of each decision they make. Policy goals tend to include the maximization of
individual or societal well-being. These attempts are made difficult, however, by the unpredictability of
human behavior. Psychological studies on happiness show that people generally return to an average level
of happiness after experiencing a significant positive or negative change in their life, a process known as the
“hedonic treadmill.” Empirical studies show that it is often difficult for people to predict their specific
utility from a given choice, leading them to make mistakes in distinguishing options.
Robson and Whitehead (2019) propose a model based on these nuances of human behavior to
provide a more descriptive quantitative basis from which to understand choice. They present a utility curve
in the form of a stepwise function in which stimuli, or choices, are inputs that the individual places
somewhere on the utility curve when making decisions. This model allows for adaptation by letting the
curve to steepen or flatten in different regions as people adapt to their new surroundings. The curve
becomes flatter when a step widens, and becomes steeper when the width of a step becomes narrower. It is
based in part on an intersectionality of economics, psychology, and neuroscience, stemming from the idea
that biological evolutionary properties affect how the brain processes information such that it ultimately
minimizes the probability of an erroneous choice being made; people choose a less enjoyable option by
mistake as infrequently as possible. Since people can store only a limited amount of information, they
adapt to be most able to understand stimuli they frequently experience, while losing some ability to discern
between less familiar stimuli. Minimization of error provides an instrumentally important aspect of
adaptation over time. The assumptions of the model as presented by Robson and Whitehead have not
previously been tested empirically.
This paper describes an economics lab experiment designed to test core assumptions and values
used in the Robson-Whitehead model. The rate at which adaptation occurs is observed as participants play
a repeated game in which they assign a large number of potential payoffs to a smaller number of possible
ranks. This ranking system creates a limited range through which participants can choose to distinguish
between payoffs. The resultant imprecision creates the necessity to adapt to choices in order to maximize
accuracy levels (and maximizing reward) over the course of the experiment. Analysis of participant
behavior in the experiment indicates that on average participants make changes to their strategies in 33%
of rounds. No significant behavioral difference is observed in rounds after a tie occurs between selected
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payoffs, but participants are more likely to make changes to their strategies in rounds immediately
following a loss. In general people prioritize avoiding the lowest payoffs more than obtaining the highest
payoffs. In most cases subjects identify the optimal strategy in conditions with even probabilities of
selections but take longer to maximize their utility under conditions when they do not know the
probabilities for selection. It is unclear if participants’ would achieve the optimal rankings given a greater
number of rounds, or if their adaptation is not sensitive enough to capture smaller marginal differences in
expected utility. These results indicate the presence of an adaptive process similar to that described by the
Robson-Whitehead model in which participants slowly adapt their strategies over time, resulting in a
long-run difference in the valuation of various payoffs. The exact speed of this adaptive process occurs
differently for each person and it is unclear from the results of this study if players would successfully adapt
without the occurrence of negative reinforcement (losing a round).
2. Literature Review
Economic research has often focused on both the importance of happiness on an individual and
global sense as well as understanding the many nuances in which people experience happiness. Some
countries include national happiness as a primary goal in their policies and directives, such as Bhutan’s
gross national happiness index. Similarly, the Happy Planet Index and the Measurement of Economic
Performance and Social Progress both incorporate subjective well-being into their statements on global
well-being, a feature that is absent from the more popular Human Development Index. Hirschauer,
Lehberger, and Musshoff (2015) analyze the potential role of happiness economics in organizing and
preparing public policy. This theoretical paper compares various models of utility with observed
phenomena such as the hedonic treadmill or the rat race. They posit that happiness provides a more
important measure from which to interpret the value of a given policy or outcome, specifically noting that
it provides a level of analysis which traditional utility models, both cardinal and ordinal, fail to capture.
In addition to its relevance in public policy, research in economics, psychology, and neuroscience
work towards a common goal of interpreting how people experience happiness, as well as investigating
manners in which happiness can be studied. Easterlin (2003) argues that adaptation of happiness depends
on the nature or domain of the good in question, evidenced by self-reported data on happiness, health, and
life satisfaction. They find that people adapt to significant life changes more in the pecuniary domain than
the non-pecuniary domain. This paper relies on social comparison – how people are always aware of the
possibility of having more in quantifiable domains – and adaptation to explain how the hedonic treadmill
encapsulates the human experience after large changes in income but does so more poorly for
non-pecuniary shifts such as divorce, moving one’s home, or serious disability.
4
The notion of this adaptation of happiness pertains to several studies on significant changes in life,
among which is Shkade and Kahneman’s (1998) question on whether moving to California would
significantly change people’s reported happiness levels. Their efforts provide an empirical backing for the
hedonic treadmill. They conducted a similar survey in both California and Michigan, questioning students
on their happiness and expected happiness were they to move to California in the case of the Michigan
students, and how Californian students would feel after moving to some new idealized paradise. The results
of both expected happiness and reported current happiness were the same between schools. This
experiment provides strong evidence that a disconnect exists between how people expect to like something
and how much they actually enjoy it, and also exemplify one way in which the hedonic treadmill can be
tested using methods of economic research.
Further work on the disconnect between expected enjoyment and actual happiness gained comes
from Berridge, Robinson, and Aldridge (2009) in their study of the components of reward. They create a
comparison between facial expressions and brain activations in both humans and animals to compare the
occurrences of liking (experiencing a stimulus), wanting (desiring to experience a stimulus), and learning
(changing the way they perceive a stimulus). They find that each of these processes link to different areas
within the brain and do not always perfectly correlate in the way they occur; a stimulus with a larger
“want” effect might have a lower “like” effect when consumed. This dissociation between processes may
partially explain how people can incorrectly estimate how they will feel about certain life changes.
Oswald and Wu (2010) analyze national data to determine whether subjective, or self-reported,
measures of happiness accurately represent real happiness. They compare data from the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System with self-reported happiness surveys to find that the results correlate by state
with P<0.001. This suggests that trends observed by various studies on happiness reflect the human
experience and could be incorporated into future models of utility. The findings from this paper grant
greater validity to previously mentioned papers as well as indicate a consistency in how people experience
happiness. Jonathan W. Schooler and Iris B. Mauss (2009) present a slightly different perspective, arguing
that being happy and having meta-awareness of happiness differ slightly. Specifically, they use
neuroscientific evidence to support a philosophical claim that happiness is not always necessarily
experienced consciously. This would suggest that there may be some level of disconnect between how
people experience stimuli and how they think they experience stimuli.
2.2 Models of utility: The concept of utility holds a central role in economics, but many
different individual studies have contributed different interpretations or revisions to the utility-based
analysis of human behavior. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) create the foundation of all modern
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discussions of utility with their argument that human decision-making follows four axioms: (1)
completeness – for all choices, some form of ranking exists– (2) transitivity – that if choice A is preferred to
B, and B to C, then A is preferred to C–, (3) continuity–given those same rankings for A,B,C, there exists
some value p where pA+ (1− P )C is equally liked as B–, and (4) independence–if A > B, then
A+ C > B + C. This study provides the original framework of choice as a rational endeavor in which the
actor seeks to maximize some form of utility when deciding between options. Debreu (1954) also discusses
this theory and notes that items or bundles can be quantified into a numerical (rankable) system of choices.
Utility connects subjective desires with a numerical system of analysis that are more easily applied to
interpretations of behavior.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) create prospect theory, the fact that people distinguish between an
exact sum and the expected value of that same sum. They discover this nuance, along with observing that
people misestimate small probabilities and weigh losses and gains differently, in a controlled lab experiment.
Moreover, people tend to put greater weight on events with a small probability of occurring, and too low of
a weight on events with high (but not guaranteed) likelihood of happening. This provides a critique of
utility theory that suggests factors other than simple maximization of expected value affect decision
making; people value different certainties, quantities, and cutoff points differently, and can also make
“errors” in their valuations.
Karni, Edi, and Schmeidler (1986) propose a model that accounts for some irregularities in human
behavior suggesting that what may seem like departures from rationality may have an evolutionary
mechanism. They point out that, from a biological standpoint, people receive a significantly greater
punishment from hitting zero (dying) than from a loss of a different degree. This explains some aspects of
risk aversion and differing human preferences between the loss and gain domains. Furthermore, it provides
a precedent for the methodology of modeling biological or psychological occurrences through economics.
Robson (2001) also argues for the importance of biological history in the formation of utility and
decision-making processes. They discuss evolutionary mechanisms and provide a series of examples of
behavioral trends that stem from these mechanisms. Utility originates from a cost/benefit system that dates
back to the origins of humanity. Subsequently, utility must evolve in a manner such that the probability of
an error (a suboptimal choice) is as low as possible, resulting in a utility curve steepest at points of the
largest number of stimuli. The Robson paper directly informs the model that will be tested in this study.
Rayo and Becker (2007) describe a utility curve with the feature that sometimes two stimuli will
appear similar enough in how much an individual enjoys them that they will be unable to distinguish which
one garners greater utility. This relates to how people distinguish visual stimuli not based on a fixed-point
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system, but rather by a comparative process. Graphically, this new assertion results in flat sections on the
utility curve where two choices seem to provide identical utility.
Netzer (2009) provides another lens of analysis for the Robson model with the use of a fitness
criterion, or expected loss, as a motivator for the evolution of utility as opposed to the probability of error.
This model creates a similarly shaped utility curve as the Robson model with the steepest section occurring
in the region with the highest frequency of choices being made, however the model specializes to a slightly
smaller degree. The less visited sections of the distribution remain steeper than the flatter corresponding
areas on the Robson model.
Robson and Whitehead (2019) later expand upon the biology of human behavior in the
specification of the model that motivates this experiment. They create a model designed to create an
intersection between evolutionary biology and economic utility theories in an adaptive, hedonic, and
cardinal model of utility. They propose a stepwise utility curve that relates directly to the firing of a neuron,
or set of neurons, in response to stimuli. Furthermore, the model incorporates randomly generated noise
which represents the inconsistency with which people make decisions. Subsequently, they will sometimes
have an error when they choose a lesser (or better) option due to this noise. Additionally, their model
includes an adaptation feature such that each stimulus observed causes the individual to adapt and become
more able to distinguish that stimulus from other extremely close stimuli in utility, but also to observe the
utility gained from that stimulus as closer to the mean. This accounts for the eventual desensitization
observed in the hedonic treadmill. This model will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
2.3 Utility in experiments: Games are often used in economic research to assess learning and
preferences or utility. Learning through games has been visited several times in experimental economics.
Erev and Roth (1998) challenge a base assumption of a rational strategy to show that people learn over the
course of a game. Using a simple matrix with 100 periods in which the optimal equilibrium involves only
mixed strategies, they find that people converge towards an equilibrium as they gain more information and
reinforcement about the game they play. This shows that preferences may change over the course of a game
as people become more aware of the results of their choices. Later, Camerer and Ho (1999) propose a
variation on this reinforcement-based learning with “experience weighted attraction” in games with some
form of uncertainty. They use varying discount rates on previous experience through rounds of a game to
show that incorporating fictitious play creates a similar outcome to reinforcement-based learning.
Cooper and Kegel (2006) show that learning in one situation transfers to other similar situations.
They let participants play in two different signaling games played sequentially. They observe a learning
process within the first game that carries into the second game, as participants perform better in the
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second game compared to unpracticed participants. This indicates that people can learn over a longer
period of time and adapt to new games using information gained in previous iterations.
Charness and Levin (2005) show that people weigh experienced consequences differently from
simple information when updating their knowledge to adapt to new occurrences. They conduct a lab
experiment in which participants choose between two urns full of two colors of balls. Participants choose
both with uncertainty and risk when making their choices as they know neither the ratio of balls nor which
urn is which. Charness and Levin find that participants tend to make mistakes when it comes to guessing
which urn holds the better payoffs. This effect is greater when they receive a good payoff from their first
pick than when they receive only information by viewing a ball as if they had picked without receiving a
reward. Similarly, Charness, Oprea, and Yukel (2018) test how people choose between and learn from
biased information sources. They form an experiment in which people are rewarded for learning about a
binary distribution and are given a series of information from different sources; they would see outcomes
drawn from several different probability distributions without ever witnessing the underlying distributions.
They find that people tend to over-emphasize information that aligns with their prior belief and actively
pursue this strategy.
Bostian and others (2005) specifically test the potential of adaptive learning (people adapt in
response to the results of their own previous behavior) in an experiment where participants choose the
quantities of a good to bring to market, then learn some information about demand based on sales. They
find that after starting at a relatively neutral position, people tend to move towards the optima but with a
constant “pull towards center” effect that keeps them either just under or just over the optimal decision in
the long run. The adaptive learning process allows participants to get close to the top solution, but that
eventually a form of inertia sets in such that people stop adjustments once they grow suitable close to the
correct distribution.
The multi armed bandit problem, as described by Farias and Madan (2011) provides context in
which to view the trade-off between learning and earning. It forces participants to choose between a series
of levers, each with a different set of payoff probabilities. They are unaware of the distributions of each
lever initially, and thus must decide which lever to pull each subsequent round, to gather more information
or to stick with the highest-paying lever found thus far. It creates a model in which direct knowledge
becomes relevant for maximizing payoffs and people will retain the most knowledge about levers they pull
frequently while remaining unable to distinguish clearly between less visited levers. Averbeck (2013) adds
an evolutionary analysis to the way 3-armed bandit strategies can be played, relating it to foraging
behavior. They note that knowledge of time horizon – or how long the game is to be played – is integral to
8
forming a strategy. In the short term taking higher probability options is more beneficial than finding the
optimal strategy, whereas in the long run it is better to information sample.
The conventional application of utility for interpretation of lab behavior is challenged by
Lichtenstein and Slavic (1971) in their discussion of preference reversals on gambles and bidding. They
show that people show inconsistency in their behavior when presented with the same choices between
gambles in different situations. The gamble that participants initially prefer often receives a lower bid in
their lab experiment. This indicates that people value choices differently depending on the situation or
manner in which they acquire them. This plays into the discussion on whether utility accounts for
behavioral inconsistencies such as these or whether they represent error on the part of the participant.
Stauffer, Lak, and Schulzs’ (2014) lab experiment featured monkeys who must decide between a
series of gambles with rewards. They found that the neuronal firings within the monkeys’ brains
corresponded to what an idealized utility curve might look like. Furthermore, they witnessed neuronal
firings that corresponded to learning as monkeys worked to correct errors made in their choices or beliefs.
This provides neurobiological basis from which to observe the empirical observations made in economics
experiments; liking, wanting, and learning occur at different times. This observation has been further
described by Peciña (2008) in neural webs within human brains. They note that distinct regions of nucleus
accumbens in neurons are responsible for liking and wanting. The activation of different regions of the
nucleus suggests that the two processes are potentially dissociable.
Siri Leknes and Irene Tracey (2008) show that pleasure (positive stimulus) and pain (negative
stimulus) are often considered and weighed on a single motivation-decision model. Effectively this argues
that pain and pleasure are very closely related such the brain can implicitly compare the two; an increase in
one will lead to a decreased hedonic experience of the other. They use molecular imaging on dopamine and
opioid processing in the brain to support their claim that this decision-making process happens on a similar
scale for both positive and negative stimuli. Tobler et. al. (2006) have participants make decisions
involving both risk and varying payoff sizes while connected to fMRI machines. They found that the
cerebral processes involved in observing risk/probability are distinct from those considering payoff sizes;
people calculate how much they like an option separately from how they calculate how likely it is to occur.
In another study with monkeys in a lab, Stauffer, Lak, and Schulz (2014) used animal choices and
brain scans to observe the relationship between various numerical observations (estimations of quantity,
value, etc.) on the cerebral processes observed during decision-making. They varied risk, quantity, and time
delay with rewards and found that similar dopamine neurons fired in response to all stimuli in a manner
consistent with what a modelled utility curve would predict. This verifies people’s assignation of some form
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of value to drastically distinct decisions when making choices. Leibovich and others (2017) also compare
the ways in which people process different kinds of information and show that people tend to rely on a
continuous interpretation of magnitude when making decisions. Contrary to number sense theory, in which
people are theorized to have an innate sense of numbers, their study shows that people learn and make
decisions about magnitudes and numerosity holistically such that their decisions depend on information
learned in the context of the choice: the values of nearby choices.
Grosskopf and Nagel (2007), raise an argument that the shift in strategies over time in beauty
contest games represents adaptive behavior. They compare patterns in beauty contest games with varying
numbers of players and varying rule sets. They find that the rate of adaptation people exhibited tended to
closely mirror the conditions in which they played, as opposed to adhering to the game-theory equilibrium
they might have discovered if they were consciously learning. This suggests that a primary motivator for
behavior in economics experiments comes from adaptation to payoffs and previous strategies.
Freeman, Halevy, and Kneeland (2019) discuss the elicitation risk preferences, specifically the
certainty equivalence, of players in an economics experiment by letting people use choice lists when deciding
between gambles. They show that the manner in which this information is presented, a list or a single
pair-wise choice, affects how people respond to these choices. Specifically, people become less risk averse
when dealing with one certain outcome when their alternative is presented in a list. This provides further
basis that preferences form depending on the context in which the decision is made. The amount of value
people place on any given choice depends on things other than just the expected value of that choice.
Cardinal utility serves as a lens through which to analyze or interpret behavior within
experimental economics. Polemarchakis and Rose (1984) show how cardinal utility can be derived based on
behavior witnessed in asset demands. They provide a theoretical model and proof that consumer behavior
can be interpreted in such a way that cardinal utility can be inferred. The relevance of cardinal and ordinal
utility is discussed in Calvo, Emilio, and Peters (2005) paper on bargaining with different types of players.
They note that traditionally bargaining has always been analyzed in the realm of cardinal utility but
provide evidence that ordinal utility can also be used in an interpretation of bargaining strategies.
Specifically, they show how a game with both ordinal and cardinal players might be solved.
Two studies look at the effectiveness of economics experiments conducted in an online
environment. Anwyl-Irvine, A.L., Massonnié, J., Flitton, A. et al. (2020) describe the technological
requirements involved in conducting an experiment online. They note that while many aspects of the
experiment may remain the same, the level of technological connectedness required in these designs far
surpasses previous systems. Participants must be connected to the server, often via multiple programs, and
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have the potential to have other distractions present. Moreover, there can be timing issues due to server
latency or slow connections. Additionally, subject recruitment may prove to be a challenge due to the
limited capacity to screen participants in these conditions. Antonio A. Arechar, Simon Gächter & Lucas
Molleman (2018) run a complicated experiment using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as a subject pool to see
how data collected in this environment compares with data collected in an in-person lab. They find that in
general people play in similar ways, but the dropout rate is significantly higher in online mediums. This
suggests that online experiments are a logistical challenge, but that the results should not be biased since
they found the drop-out rate to be uncorrelated with performance in the experiment.
3. Theoretical Framework
The economic experiment described in this paper is heavily informed by the theoretical model
provided by Robson and Whitehead (2019). Their model accounts for empirical observations of nuances in
human choice: randomness, reversals, learning, and long run adaptation. At its core, the model relates
stimuli – all the experiences and choices a person can observe and make decisions between – and the neural
firings in the brain. Whenever a person observes a stimulus, some number of “want” neurons fire in the
brain. The number of neurons that fire guides the decision-making process for the individual. Because
there is a distinction between how the brain processes “want” and “like” – i.e., desiring an outcome vs.
actually experiencing said outcome – there is room for some inconsistencies or errors to occur. In this
paper, the notion of error in choice refers to some of the potential outcomes of these inconsistencies. First,
a stimulus might fire a different proportion of “want” neurons relative to “like” neurons, resulting in a
person either over- or underestimating how much they will enjoy that stimulus. As a result of this
occurrence, they might become unable to tell differently liked stimuli apart in terms of how much they want
them, or they might mistakenly want the less-liked stimulus. Both cases result in a person mistakenly
choosing a suboptimal outcome, or in other words making an error.
To motivate the adaptive properties of the model, it is assumed that cerebral processes necessitate
a certain level of inaccuracy as people cannot possibly retain all information on all different stimulus in the
short run. Nevertheless, it is possible to learn or adapt to certain stimuli to make it less likely an error
occurs, but always at the cost of giving up some retained knowledge for a different, less frequently
unobserved stimulus. The model then functions as a description of how a person behaves as they witness,
decide between, and experience a series of stimuli. Long run adaptation occurs with the objective of
eliminating as many short-term errors as possible and is based on information individuals receive as they
make choices and experience stimuli.
The actual design of the model is conducted in several steps. First, it takes as an input some
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stimulus y ∈ [0, 1]. Then, z = h(y) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the “like” function, or rather the proportion of “like”
neurons that fire in the brain. To capture the inconsistencies or randomness that occurs in choice, they add
a noise function d̃. Then h̃(y) = h(y) + d̃δ. This function maps h : [0, 1]→ {0, δ, 2δ, 3δ, ..., Nδ = 1}. d̃ is
some integer ∈ −D, ...,D where d̃ = 0 with probability π0, d̃ = ±1 with probability π1 and so forth. This
creates a symmetrical noise function where π0 − π1 > π1 − π2 > ... > πD−1 − πD > πD > 0. The result of
this “want” function is the step-function depicted in figure 1. The x-axis shows h(y), and the y-axis shows
h̃(y). The noise function results in movements to the left or right where an observation will have a h̃ value
different from its h value. If the noise would result in a stimulus appearing to be either less than 0 or
greater than 1, then the noise is reset to 0.
The cutoff points for each step are then given a rank xn, n = 1, 2, ...N to denote the cutoff points,
or end points for each step. Adaptation occurs as these cutoff points shift. The narrower the step, the less
likely it is that an error occurs that involves the stimuli within that step. The cutoff points move based on
the following function:
xt+1n =

xtn + ε with probability ξ if h(y) + d̃δ = nδ
xtn − ε with probability ξ if h(y) + d̃δ = (n− 1)δ
xtn otherwise
(1)
Both ε and ξ are constant values that will affect the rate at which the utility curve adapts to observations.
Effectively what this function states is that whenever a stimulus is observed, the step within which that
stimulus falls (after noise is added) has the possibility of tightening by some small margin. As a person
makes repeated choices, the steps with the most frequent observations will become very narrow, and the
steps that are infrequently visited will widen. Since it is assumed that the frequency of past observation is a
good indicator of future observations, this lowers the odds of an error occurring.
The hedonic treadmill effect also occurs as a result of this adaptive process. Since the height of
the steps remains at a constant value of δ and the number of steps cannot change, the sections with the
tightest steps, or the steepest curve, will gravitate towards a more central position on the Y-axis. This
would explain how a person who initially experiences a significant change in their happiness level slowly
returns to their average happiness level as the slower shifts in thresholds occur. These shifts explain how
the way a person processes and thinks about different stimuli changes over time.
4. Experimental Design
4.1 Overview:
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This paper documents the results of an economics lab experiment designed to test the manner in
which people adapt as per the assumptions made in the Robson-Whitehead model. In an online lab
environment accessible via web-browser, participants make choices in a repeated game with limited
information. All subjects are provided with a guaranteed 5$ “show up fee” and are further compensated
based on their decisions within the experiment. Earnings range from 9-21$, with an average of 15$1.
Experimental sessions were conducted during the month of August of 2020 in an online format 2. Subjects
were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015), the standard recruitment procedure used at Loyola
Marymount University Economics Department’s. Individuals learn about the system through various
advertisements and, once registered with ORSEE, receive email-invitations to sign up for the individual
experiments. Volunteer participants received an email in advance of the experiment containing a link to a
Zoom conference call and to a weblink for a server hosted zTree client. Participants in the zoom call could
see names of other participants in Zoom’s participants tab, but could not unmute their microphones, chat
universally, or turn on the video function. Experiment instructions were read to participants by the
facilitator over Zoom and also given in writing in the zLeaf experimental program. Participants could also
ask questions during the experiment by direct messaging the Zoom host. Informed consent and payment
information were collected as the first stage in the zLeaf interface before the experiment began. People
could choose between Venmo and a mailed check for payment3.
After entering payment information and receiving instructions, participants are shown a series of
17 payoffs increasing in increments of 50 from 60-860. An experimental currency (ECU) is used with an
exchange rate of 200 ECU/USD. Participants are then asked to rank each payoff from 1-4, with 1 being the
least-preferred and 4 being the most-liked. Since there are 17 payoffs and only four categories, by necessity
many payoffs must receive the same rankings. After all payoffs have been ranked, the experiment randomly
selects two payoffs. All payoffs initially have equal probability of selection. Of the two payoffs randomly
selected, the one the participant ranked more highly will be used for payment. If both selected payoffs have
the same ranking, however, then one of the two will be selected at random for payment. Participants are
shown which payoffs were selected and which one they received. They then return to the ranking page in
which they may reassign rankings to the payoffs and the process repeats. A frequency table of which
payoffs have been selected thus far by the computer is visible on their screen. Figures 1 and 2 below show
the screens subjects see while making decisions.
1Funding comes from a Phi Beta Kappa research grant provided by the Loyola Marymount University chapter.
2Tests were run during the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, all testing had to be done remotely.
3out of 67 subjects only four chose to be paid via a mailed physical check. The rest opted for Venmo
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Figure 1: Example of a ranking screen in the experiment
Figure 2: Example of a round summary screen
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After 10 rounds of playing at these random probabilities, participants are asked to describe how
they ranked the payoffs in the preceding rounds and why they chose those rankings. Participants are
informed that the likelihood of which payoffs will get selected has changed such that it is no longer equal
for all payoffs. The nature of this probability shift will depend on the treatment group of the subject.
Subjects randomly assigned to the “low” treatment (treatmeant 0) group will face an increased probability
that the lower valued payoffs will be selected. Subjects randomly assigned to the “high” treatment
(treatment 1) will encounter more frequent selection of the higher valued payoffs. Subjects are not informed
as to their assigned experimental treatment group nor the new probabilities they will experience. These
shifts in probability simulate a significant life change for the worse or better, respectively; the majority of
all choices and stimuli observed by an individual are different from the average stimulus witnessed
previously. Participants play the game for an additional 25 rounds under the new conditions. At the end of
all rounds, participants are asked again to describe their rankings and rationale for those rankings. After a
short demographic survey, four rounds are randomly selected to be used for payment. The following flow
chart describes the steps taken by each subject in each round.
Figure 3: Steps taken in each round
The main goal of this experiment is to observe patterns and trends with which people shift their
rankings. The initial few rounds provide a baseline within which people learn the game and conform to any
pre-existing preferences, such as aversions to specific ranges of payoffs. Subsequently, it can be observed
how different conditions lead people to make changes in their rankings. The likelihood with which people
change their rankings after a payoff is selected simulates the ξ value defined in the Robson-Whitehead
model. We observe the likelihood with which people shift their rankings after each selection period, after
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ties occur, and after specifically losing a tie.
4.2 Optimal play: Despite being unaware of the exact probabilities of selection, people may
still optimize their play based on the information they witness. Within each round, two payoffs are selected.
We will call the two payoffs i, j, where i, j refers to the ordinal value of the selected payoff with i, j = 1
referring to the lowest valued payoff, and i 6= j. Then Pi refers to the probability that payoff with ordinal
value i is selected and Pj refers to the probability for payoff j. These probabilities are both given by the
experiment and participants cannot affect them. The participants may, however, sort the payoffs into four
categories, which we will call A,B,C,D, with A being the lowest and D being the highest. Then
|A| = XA, |B| = XB , |C| = XC , |D| = XD. We can then write the total expected payoff of any strategy as:
E(x) =
17∑
i=1
17∑
j=1
j 6=i
PiPjYijXAXBXC
This equation is the sum, for all pairs, of the probability of that pair being selected times the payoff that
will be received based on the participant’s rankings.
Participants maximize their expected payoff by trying, in general, to get higher Y values for pairs
that have a heavier weight given by Pi, Pj . The only time it is possible to not receive the optimal payoff is
when a tie occurs in the rankings, assuming all payoffs are ranked in an ordinally rational manner (i.e, no
payoff receives a higher rankings than a higher valued payoff). Whenever this happens, there is a risk of
receiving the lower of the two payments. Thus, the goal of the participants is to minimize both the
probability and magnitude of errors occurring. With the pretreatment probabilities, the optimal strategy
would be XA = XB = XC = XD, but since 17 cannot subdivide evenly by 4, one category arbitrarily
receives an additional payoff. The optimal strategy with the high treatment probabilities is
XA = 10, XB = 3, XC = 2, XD = 2, though it should be noted that participants are not explicity told the
probabilities and thus cannot calculate this strategy. In the low treatment, the probabilities are inverted
such that Pi in the high treatment equals P18−i in the low treatment. The values of the payments remain
unchanged. The optimal strategy depends on the probability of a tie occurring and the relative distance
between the values of the different payoffs. Since the marginal change in value between payoffs is constant
between all payoffs and the probability distribution in the low treatment is simply an inversion of that of
the high treatment, the optimal strategy in the low treatment is the inverse of the high treatments’:
XA = 2, XB = 2, XC = 3, XD = 10.
Table 1 compares the expected payoffs and probability of a tie occurring for different strategies a
player might employ. Figure 4 shows the step utility function in both of these equilibria for the high
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treatment. The graphs in figure 4 provide an example of what utility curve and distribution of payoffs look
like in pretreatment and high treatment conditions.
Table 1: Expected value and tie probability in the high treatment
Pretreatment,
even-split strategy
Posttreatment,
even-split strategy
Posttreatment,
clustering in A
Expected Value 600.8 ECU 776.3 ECU 798.9 ECU
Probability of a tie .206 .495 .201
Figure 4: Optimal play before and after treatment in the high treatment group
This optimal strategy can be found by considering the probability each pair of payoffs have of
being selected multiplied against the outcome of what would happen if those payoffs were to be selected.
Participants can arrange their rankings to minimize the probability of ties occurring and, subsequently,
them receiving the lower of the two payoffs. It is important to note that players are highly unlikely to jump
directly to a radically different new strategy, however. Instead, they are much more likely to slowly adjust
the cutoff points similar to the shifts of xn over time in the Robson-Whitehead model. If this is the case,
then each shift must be considered as its own individual change in strategy. Players must be significantly
motivated enough to continue to make small shifts until they reach an equilibrium
Let Gg be the utility gained by moving a payoff down from bin g + 1, and let Fg be the utility
gained by moving a payoff up from category g, where g ∈ {1, 2, 3}]. an refers to the nth payoff in bin A,
and a, b, c are constants equal to the difference between two adjacent payoffs where a = b = c. The following
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proof shows that at least one of the following G and F values must be positive in order for a shift in
rankings to be beneficial to the player:
G1 = aPb1 [
∑XA
h=1 Pah(XA + 1− h)(−
1
2
) +
∑XB
i=1 Pbi(
1
2
(i− 1))]
G2 = bPc1 [
∑XB
i=1 Pbi(XB + 1− i)(−
1
2
) +
∑XC
j=1 Pcj (
1
2
(j − 1))]
G3 = cPd1 [
∑XC
j=1 Pcj (XC + 1− j)(−
1
2
) +
∑XD
k=1 Pdk(
1
2
(k − 1))]
F1 = aPaXa[
∑XA
h=1 Pah(XA − h)(
1
2
) +
∑XB
i=1 Pbi(
−1
2
i)]
F2 = bPbXb[
∑XB
i=1 Pbi(XB − i)(
1
2
) +
∑XC
j=1 Pcj (
−1
2
j)]
F3 = cPcXc[
∑XC
j=1 Pcj (XC − j)(
1
2
) +
∑XD
k=1 Pdk(
−1
2
k)]
G1 is the difference in utility that occurs from moving the lowest payoff in bin B into bin A. G2 is
the difference in utility that occurs from moving the lowest payoff in bin C into bin B. G2 is the difference
in utility that occurs from moving the lowest payoff in bin D into bin C.
F1 is the difference in utility that occurs from moving the highest payoff in bin A into bin B. F2 is
the difference in utility that occurs from moving the highest payoff in bin B into bin C. F3 is the difference
in utility that occurs from moving the highest payoff in bin C into bin D.
An optimal strategy occurs when all of these G and F values are negative or equal to zero.
Proof:
Let |A| = XA and |B| = XB , and let axa be the highest gamble initially in bin A and b1 be the
lowest initially in bin B. Let Pa1 be the probability of gamble a1 being chosen, and Pb1 be the probability of
gamble b1 being chosen.
We will show that the decision for moving a gamble is defined by the likelihood of that payoff
being chosen and the number of other payoffs in that bin and adjacent bins.
Moving a payoff into a higher bin increases the odds of that payoff being selected, and the
opposite is also true. The effect of switching the ranking of two payoffs relative to their value is to increase
the probability of the lower gamble being chosen, which is never advantageous. Thus the ordinal ranking
should always follow the values of payoffs.
Since payoffs should not be switched in order, for a payoff to be moved into a different bin it must
be one of the cutoff values, otherwise it would result in a reversed ordering. For example, if gamble b2 is
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moved in to bin A then it would be ranked lower than gamble b1, which is not advantageous. Thus, b2
cannot move unless b1 is moved first. We therefore only must check edge values between bins to determine
if any gambles should be moved.
The overall payoff is determined as a series of weighted probabilities. For each pair of payoffs we
multiple the probability of that pair being selected with the expected payoff for that pair. When shifting a
payoff from one bin to another, the probability of that payoff being selected does not change. All that
changes is the expected payoff that will occur if that pair is selected. Any pairs that do not include that
payoff will not change in any way. When comparing strategies we must only do so for affected pairs; we
compare only the pairs that include both the moved payoff and a payoff in either that original bin or the
receiving bin for the moved payoff.
In an equilibrium state it must be not optimal to change the ranking for any payoff, i.e to shift
any cutoff up or down. Since there are four bins, and therefore three cutoff points, and it must be checked
in both directions, each equilibrium must therefore satisfy six conditions. Since the total payoff is
calculated via the weighted probabilities of the payoffs given by any possible pair being chosen and the
ranking’s have no effect on probabilities, the only payoffs that change with a new ranking are those given
by pairs in which one member has changed categories. This combined with the above statements let us
develop the following payoff scheme differences:
Let G be the utility gained by moving d1 into bin C. Equation 4 shows the different parts of this
calculation:
4.1: G = [
1
2
Pd1(Pc1(c1 + d1) + Pc2(c2 + d1) + ...+ PcXC−1(cXC−1 + d1) + PXC (XXC + d1))]
4.2: +[Pd1(Pd2d2 + ...PdXD−1dXD−1 + PdXD dXD )]
4.3: −[Pd1d1(Pc1 + Pc2...+ PcXC−1 + PcXC )]
4.4: −[ 1
2
Pd1(Pd2(d2 + d1) + ...+ PdXD−1(XDm−1 + d1) + PdXD (dXD + d1))]
4.1 and 4.2 are the payoffs received by moving d1 while 4.3 and 4.4 are the payoffs recieived by leaving d1 in
D.
4.1 is the sum of the expected payoffs given by d1 and a payoff in C. It is the sum of the probability of each
pair occurring multiplied by the average payoff given if that pair is selected.
4.2 is the sum of the pairs combining d1 with a payoff in D. Each term is the probability of the pair being
selected times the payoff they receive if this pair is selected.
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4.3 is the comparison of d1 with payoffs in C once more, but now for the strategy of leaving d1 in D.
4.4 is the sum of d1 and payoffs in D if d1 is left in D.
If G > 0, then it as advantageous to put y1 in the lower category, and if G < 0 it is advantageous
to leave it in the higher category. Next, since the payoffs’ values are evenly spaced such that c2 = 2c,
c3 = 3c and so forth, we can substitute these values to get all c and d values in terms of c.
Then, by substitution:
G = [
1
2
Pd1(Pc1c(XC + 2) + Pc2c(X + C + 3) + ...+ PcXC−1c(2XC) + PcXC (2XC + 1))]
+[Pd1(Pd2c(XC + 2) + ...PdXD−1c(XC +XD − 1) + PdXD c(XC +XD))]
- [Pd1c(XC + 1)(Pc1 + Pc2 ...+ PcXC−1 + PcXC )]
−[ 1
2
Pd1(Pc2c(2XC + 3) + ...+ PdXD−1c(2XC +XD) + PdXD c(2XC +XD + 1))]
From here we can collect like terms and find the following equation:
G=
cPd1 [Pc1(
n
2
− n) + Pc2(
n
2
− 1
2
− n) + ...+ (−1)Pcn−1 + (−
1
2
)Pcn +
1
2
Pd2 + ...+ Pdm−1(
m
2
) + Pym(−
m
2
+
1
2
)]
This can be rewritten as G=cPd1 [
∑n
j=1 Pcj (n+ 1− j)(
−1
2
) +
∑m
k=1 Pdk(
1
2
(k − 1))]
The equation we derived above is what we can use to determine the six conditions needed to
establish an equilibrium. First, we must create a slightly adjusted equation for moving a payoff up in
ranking as opposed to down, which we will call F.
F = cPcn [
∑n
j=1 Pcj (n− j)(
1
2
) +
∑m
k=1 Pdk(
−1
2
k)]
This equation is derived the same way as G, except in this case cXC is the payoff that is shifting.
Recall that cXC is the highest payoff in C, and that d1 is the lowest payoff in bin D. Once again, if F is
positive then cXC should be moved, whereas if it is negative then cXC should remain in C. This gives us our
six equilibrium conditions, all of which should be less than or equal to 0 in an equilibrium. When we
substitute in the probabilities used in this experiment for the values of P , we find the following optimal
strategies. In each strategy payoffs are ranked such that no payoff receives a higher ranking than any higher
payoff. The number of payoffs that must receive each ranking under each set of conditions are listed below
with the format [XA, XB , XC , XD]:
Pre-treatment: [4-4-4-5], [4-4-5-4], [4-5-4-4], [5-4-4-4]
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Post-treatment(high): [10-3-2-2]
Post-treatment(low): [2-2-3-10]
4.3 Hypotheses
Despite the presence of optimal strategies, it is unlikely for people to perfectly play these
strategies, especially in later rounds where they lack knowledge of the exact probability distribution. The
hypotheses are as follows:
1. Participants should gravitate to a roughly even split of payoffs in the pre-treatment rounds, with some
occasional minor changes due to learning processes.
2. If people are responsive to entering the treatment phase, then they will shift their payoffs within the first
five rounds of treatment conditions such that the most frequently selected payoffs have fewer other payoffs
with the same rank.
3. If subjects respond more to ties than to information (observation of which payoffs have been selected
with greater frequency), then they shift payoffs with greater frequency immediately after ties occur.
Data from this experiment reveal that in general participant behavior aligns with hypothesis 1,
with a small deviation where people put slightly too many payoffs in the highest bin while shrinking the
lowest bin in order to avoid receiving the lowest payoffs. Per hypothesis 2, almost all subjects began
shifting rankings within the first three rounds post-treatment, but were significantly more likely to make
changes after losing a round than when they continue to win rounds. Hypothesis 3 is not supported by the
data as all regression models indicate that witnessing ties in rankings has a smaller, less significant effect on
participant behavior than does losing a round or simple progression through the game.
5. Results
Data were analyzed using STATA. Analytic techniques included descriptive measures (means,
range, etc), probit regressions, and fixed effects time analyses clustered across bundles of similar rounds.
Variables of interest include the frequency and probability of changes to rankings, expected utility, tied
rankings, losing a round, treatment group, player type, gender, college/major, and ethnicity. See appendix
for log and .do files. New variables for “anychange”, “changesmade”, ”type2”, “tie”, and “roundlost” are
generated. “anychange” evaluates to 1 in a round if at least one payoff holds a different ranking than it did
in the previous round, and “changesmande” counts the total number of differences between the current and
the previous round. “type2” divides players based on observed differences in their ranking methods after
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data was collected and will be discussed more thoroughly later in this section.. “tie” is equal to 1 for a
player in a round if the two payoffs selected in the previous round held the same ranking. “roundlost”
equals 1 when the player received the lower of the two selected payoffs in the round previous.
Demographic information was gathered in a survey at the end of the experiment. Questions
included gender, college/major, ethnicity, as well as a series of questions about their character, including
perfectionism, life satisfaction, risk-taking, detail-orientation, preferential towards guaranteed sums than
gambles, and desiring of a major life change were also evaluated. 95% of students came from Loyola
Marymount University, which has its programs divided into six schools: liberal arts, communication and
fine arts, business and administration, film and television, education, and science and engineering. Dummies
for each of these schools were created and tested for significance in the models, omitting the school of film
and television. An additional dummy is used to isolate math-based majors4. For the demographic questions
were asked how well each trait described them and responded on an agreement scale that ranges from 1-45.
Of the ninety-two individuals who participated, sixty-seven showed up on time for the online
experiment and sixty-five completed all stages of the experiment. Of the two subjects who did not complete
the experiments and were thus omitted from some analyses, one disconnected within the first five minutes,
and the other disconnected after the main stages of the experiment were completed but before the
demographic survey.
Average duration for this experiment was forty-two minutes, with the longest session lasting
fifty-three minutes and the shortest lasting thirty-four minutes. The number of subjects per session ranged
from three to nine, with an average of six. The average earnings were $15, with a range of $9-21.2; earnings
were, unsurprisingly, strongly correlated with the treatment group such that subjects randomly assigned to
the “high” treatment group earned an average of $18.4 while those randomly assigned to the “low”
treatment group earned an average of $12.16.
Age of participants ranged from 18 to 55, with 93 percent of subjects falling between 18 and 23
years of age. Fifty-seven percent of subjects were female. 7.8 percent of study participants self-identified as
black, 25 percent Asian, 43 percent Caucasian, 14 percent Hispanic, 1.5 percent native American, and 7.8
percent “other”. Compared to the general LMU student body, these demographics contain slightly more
Asian students and slightly fewer Hispanic students. Subjects came from different academic backgrounds,
with the largest portion (30 percent) coming from the school of business.
4Economics, applied/theoretical mathematics, business, physics, and engineering students are included in this group
51=strongly disagree, 2=slightly disagree, 3=slightly agree, 4=strongly agree
6Participants who ended the experiment with less than $8 total earnings would be credited so their earnings would total $8,
but all subjects already made more than this amount in the experiment.
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The different demographic variables are analyzed for significance in the models and their
relationship to other variables. The correlation table below7 (3) shows the correlations between ethnicity
and the primary variables of interest in the regression models. Though the coefficients might suggest that
Asian or native American participants are less likely to be Type 2 players and Hispanic subjects are more
likely to be Type 2 players, the small sample size represented in each of these categories makes it hard to
draw any meaningful conclusions. Slightly more Asian and black participants are female. Additionally
white participants make changes to their strategy less often and black students slightly more often, but
both these coefficients are relatively small in scale. Additionally, Fischer exact tests failed to find significant
relationships between these player-type, sex, college, or subjects’ responses to questions on character.
Ethnic and racial identities were not found to be significant in any of the regression models. These variables
are thus omitted from later regressions in this paper due to small effects on R2, low statistical significance,
or minimal effects on other coefficients in the model. A regression table containing these models can be
found in the appendix.
Table 2: Correlation table for racial identities
anychange female type2 white asian black hispanic natamerican
anychange 1
female 0.179∗∗∗ 1
type2 0.161∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 1
white -0.0673∗∗ -0.0120 -0.00307 1
asian 0.0282 0.201∗∗∗ -0.0893∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗ 1
black 0.0645∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.0475∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ 1
hispanic 0.0187 -0.201∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ 1
natamerican -0.0467∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.0864∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.0714∗∗∗ -0.0361 -0.0501∗ 1
raceother 0.0113 -0.105∗∗∗ 0.00699 -0.277∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.0921∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.0399
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The data collected regarding the participant’s college or field of study is analyzed by college for
significant relationships with variables of interest. The table below (Table 4) shows the correlations
between education and major model variables. Math majors are not individually found to have a strong
relationship with the major variables of interest – namely “anychange” or Player type. Liberal arts majors
are less likely to be in Type 2 and are slightly more likely to change their strategy in a given round. Liberal
arts and School of Education are the only colleges whose effects are statistically significant on the regression
models with the primary variables of interest. Note, however, that pseudo r2 remains unchanged and these
colleges had minimal effect on other coefficients. Most of the changes in other coefficients can be explained
by the correlations between these colleges and both gender and Playtype. These models are available in the
appendix.
7A full correlation table with all variables included in this study is available in the appendix. Smaller tables were used in
the main paper for easier readability
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Table 3: Correlation table for colleges and variables of interest
anychange female type2 math BCLA SOE CBA CSE CFA
anychange 1
female 0.179∗∗∗ 1
type2 0.161∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 1
math 0.0302 0.0316 -0.0223 1
BCLA 0.106∗∗∗ -0.0855∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.0208 1
SOE 0.0196 -0.147∗∗∗ -0.0864∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.0925∗∗∗ 1
CBA 0.0261 0.219∗∗∗ 0.0620∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.0894∗∗∗ 1
CSE -0.0659∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.0210 0.00656 -0.226∗∗∗ -0.0533∗ -0.215∗∗∗ 1
CFA -0.0486∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.00699 -0.208∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.0399 -0.116∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The following correlation table shows the relationship between the questions on participants
character and other major variables of interest in the analytic model. None of these variables were
statistically significant in the full regression models. Changes witnessed in other coefficients could be
explained by the relationship held between these variables and gender, player type, or treatment. With a
larger sample size these variables likely could have shown to have a greater effect. The regression models
that include these variables can be found in the appendix.
Table 4: Correlation table for self-described characteristics
anychange female type2 Wantchange Perfectionist Minval Detailorient
anychange 1
female 0.179∗∗∗ 1
type2 0.161∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 1
Wantchange 0.0874∗∗∗ 0.0458∗ -0.000000188 1
Perfectionist 0.109∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 1
Minval 0.128∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.0630∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 1
Detailorient 0.125∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ -0.00533 0.343∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Three different patterns in participants’ styles of play were identified. Type 1 players seemed to
identify a general strategy that they adhered to closely within the first few rounds of the experiment. They
are defined as individuals with an incorrect ordinal ranking in no more than three rounds. This group was
characterized by actions such as maintaining an ordinally rational ranking (i.e., never ranking a lower
payoff with a higher value than any higher payoff) and making fewer changes to their rankings on average
per round than the other two groups; 35 people fall into this group. Type 2 players take a more “trial and
error” approach when assigning rankings. They tend to change their rankings much more readily and
sometimes, possibly as part of a trial and error process, make rank payoffs in an irrational manner (ranking
at least one low payoff with a higher value than some higher payoffs). Type 3 players are defined as
continuing to have key payoffs (the highest two in treatment 1, and the lowest two in treatment 0)
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incorrectly ranked by the last three rounds without adaptation to their losses, or by making an average of
12 changes or more to their strategy per round over the course of the entire game. The third group
comprised individuals that both often chose irrational rankings and did not adapt to occurrences in
previous rounds. Participants in this latter group likely failed to understand some element of the game or
were not motivated to maximize earnings. For this reason, group 3 was removed from all analyses; six
subjects were in this third group type. These six were uncorrelated with ethnicity or major/education.
Women were evenly distributed across type 1 and type 2, but men are much more likely to fall into type 1,
with only two men in type 2. A Fischer exact test confirms the statistic significance of this distribution
(p=.002). Table 6 (below) shows the number of rounds in which each player type behave irrationally.
Tables 9-11 (below) describe subject behavior over the course of the game and include the
median rankings and the mean expected utility in each round8. The optimal strategy in the pretreatment
round involves grouping payoffs evenly in each bin; for example, making the bin sizes 4-4-4-5 is optimal.
During treatment, the optimal strategy changes such that the highest expected utility occurs with a
ranking of 2-2-3-10 and 10-3-2-2 for the Low and High treatment groups, respectively. The horizontal
divisions within each table indicates the optimal cutoff points for the rankings, and the colored areas
indicate which payoffs are given which rankings on average by the participants. The maximum possible
expected utility and the average expected utility of participants are both shown at the top. The red areas
show payoffs that players assign the rank 4 on average, yellow shows the areas assigned rank 3 on average,
green the rank 2 on average, and blue rank 1 on average. In optimal play it would be expected that the
colored areas eventually line up with the horizontal divisions by the end of the game.
Type 1 players play close to theory, reaching the optimal strategy in the pretreatment rounds in
one treatment group, and nearly reaching optimality in the other treatment group. In both treatments
Type 1 players show some aversion to the lowest payoffs, giving fewer payoffs rankings of 1 and more
payoffs rankings of 3 or 4. They rarely over-adapt in the treatment rounds; in only a few rounds do they
reverse a shift they made in a previous round. By the end of the game they correctly rank the four most
chosen payoffs but have not sufficiently fine-tuned their rankings after this point. The payoffs they correctly
rank typically include the most commonly selected payoffs under treatment conditions. The greater
selection rate of these payoffs means that they have a larger impact on the expected utility of the strategy
than other less-chosen payoffs. As a result, Type 1 players still manage to capture most of the potential
expected utility, missing, in total, only 6 ECU in the low treatment and 10 ECU in the high treatment
compared to the optimal expected utility.
8A similar table that displays mean rankings can be found in the appendix. Median rankings are used for easier readability
and elimination of noise caused by outliers in various rounds.
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Table 9: Average rankings in the high treatment for type 1 players
Table 10: Average rankings in the high treatment for type 2 players
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Table 11: Average rankings in the low treatment for type 1 players
Table 12: Average rankings in the low treatment for type 2 players
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The higher variation in the strategies of type 2 players can be seen in the overlapping spreads of values and
preponderance of irrational rankings. Type 2 players require a longer learning period, for both high and low
treatment groups, than type 1 players. In the High treatment, most type 2 players begin to create close to
optimal rankings only after nearly 20 rounds and many continue to submit irrational rankings through the
final rounds. Nevertheless, these players still exhibit many of the same trends witnessed in type 1 players.
They initially prefer putting fewer payoffs in the lowest bins and instead opt to widen the upper bins. In
the treatment rounds, they adapt more quickly than type 1 players to changes in probability, and, in
several cases, over adapt, as can be seen in rounds 17-23 of the low treatment where they experiment with
giving only one payoff the lowest ranking. Though they exhibit many fluctuations and irrationalities, they
begin to learn and adjust rankings in areas where they witness frequent selections; the regions of the table
that contain frequently selected payoffs begin to resemble optimality before the ranking areas that are
infrequently selected. In the Low treatment they visually appear to arrive at a set of rankings closer to
optimality than that reached by type 1, but the presence of several irrational rankings drags down their
average expected utility. In total, they manage to capture all but 15 of the optimal ECU in the Low
treatment and all but 31 ECU in the High treatment by the end of the game.
Tables 13 and 14 below shows the average number of changes in strategy exhibited by type 1 and
type 2 players in each round. For both groups, the first three rounds display a greater amount of variance
as people learn the rules of the game. In the open-ended question asked after the first ten rounds, several
subjects identify some confusion with the ranking system that they held for the first two rounds. For this
reason, the first three rounds are removed from regressions and analyses due to potential learning effects.
There are observable trends in how type 1 and type 2 players change their rankings, and a t-test reveals a
statistically significant difference in the two groups’ average number of rank changes clustered in rounds
3-10, 11-24, and 25-35. Type 1 players adhere to their strategies much more consistently and show less
variance of rankings across all 35 rounds. In 81% of all rounds type 1 players make no changes to their
strategies with an average of .85 (t=11.83) changes and a standard deviation of 2.7 (p¡.001). Type 2 players
are much more responsive and make more changes on average per round. In 66% of rounds type 2 players
make no change, with an average of 1.31 (t=11.7) and standard deviation of 2.9. In both cases the rate at
which players make changes to their strategies diminishes over the course of the game.
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Participants’ responses to receiving the lower of the two selected payoffs (“roundlost”) is measured
in fixed effects regressions shown in tables 15 and 16. Fixed effects are observed by subject id. Rounds are
grouped before regressions are run based on where similar behavior is both predicted and observed. The
first three rounds are omitted as a learning period for the game. Rounds 3-10 form the “earlyround” group
and rounds 25-35 form the “lateround” group. The behavior of type 1 players was used to initially
determine the cutoff point between middle rounds (11-24) and late rounds; there is a noticeable decrease in
both the average number of changes and the standard deviation of that average after round 24 for these
players. Three t-tests comparing means of changes made in these three groups show that all three
groupings are significantly different from each other. In the early rounds, participants are aware that all
payoffs have the same probability of selection and are still relatively new to the game; these rounds contain
the highest number of changes in rankings. In the middle rounds, participants know that the probabilities
have shifted but have played only a few rounds with the new conditions. In the late rounds, participants
have a good idea of what payoffs are most frequently selected and are making final adjustments based on
trial and error or fine tuning. The fewest average number of changes per round occur in this section.
Table 14 shows a fixed effects probit regression that uses a dichotomous outcome of whether any
change was made in a person’s rankings in a given round; overall players made no changes to their strategy
in 77% of rounds. The model uses losing a round as the primary independent variable of interest; control
variables include treatment, a tie occurring, gender, round number, and playtype. Type 3 players are
omitted due to increased levels of irrationality observed with those players as are results from rounds 1-3
since in these rounds participants were still learning the basic game play, as evidenced by the
disproportionately high number of errors in these rounds. Interaction terms are included to capture the
relationship between type 2 players and both treatment and ties. The relationship between type 2 players
and gender was also tested but it did not significantly impact the model.
In all regression columns losing a round has a statistically significant positive effect of between
65% and 82% on the probability of changing strategy. Participants lose rounds most often when ties occur,
making these two variables strongly related. This makes it difficult to distinguish the effects of these
variables. With the addition of the interaction term between tie and type2, tie gains statistical significance
and the coefficient on roundlost decreases by about .05. This suggests that type 2 players respond less to
ties than do type 1 players. The small increase in pseudo R2 from .229 to .240 in regression 10 suggests
that this difference in player types significantly affects the predictive ability of the model. Player type has a
consistent positive coefficient but is not statistically significant nor does it hold a constant sign across the
different regressions. Treatment is significant at the 90% level, indicating that people change strategies
130% more often in the high treatment. Gender is insignificant in the model, but this is expected due to
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the correlation between player type and gender. Per regression 10, in early and late rounds people are 34%
more and 50% less likely, respectively, to make changes to their rankings. The addition of the interaction
term between treatment and type 2 player does not appear to impact the model in any meaningful way. An
interaction between female and type 2 was tested on both this model and the following regression model (as
shown in table 15) and was not found to have a significant effect in either case.
Table 15 shows a similar set of regressions to table 1, but with the outcome of the total number of
changes made by an individual in each round. Additional controls are added in a stepwise fashion as before.
The coefficient on “roundlost” is significant at all levels for all the modeled regressions; regression 10
suggests that losing the previous round leads to on average .97 more changes in strategy in the current
round. The control variable for the round in which play occurs has a statistically significant impact with
participants making .48 fewer changes during later rounds on average and .55 more changes in early rounds;
the addition of the control variable for round resulted in one of the larger changes in R2 from .176 to .216.
Player type is not statistically significant in most of the regressions and has a sign that changes value
several times between different regressions. Likewise, tie is never statistically significant and has very small
effect sizes. Treatment is not statistically significant and has a coefficient of -.18 in regression 10, which
notably of the opposite sign observed in the previous regression table. The interaction terms for tie and
type2 affects the coefficients on tie and type 2 but does not otherwise impact the predictive power of the
model nor does it achieve statistical significance. Likewise, the interaction between treatment and type 2
affects treatment and type 2 but otherwise does not impact the model.
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6. Discussion
This experiment is the first to empirically test the Robson-Whitehead theoretical model (2019)
and to have been run to simulate adaptive utility models in evolutionary game theory. This study observes
the rate at which people shift their preferences as they receive information and are presented with different
choices. Limiting the decision-making ability of participants forces them to model their choices as a
step-function where the control they possess is shifting cutoff points. Most participants proved to be
content to leave their rankings unchanged in most rounds, changing their strategies only after incurring a
loss or after observing a significant change in probabilities over several rounds.
In the Robson-Whitehead model ξ refers to the likelihood with which people change their
strategies after observing a set of selections. This value can be proxied in part by the effect of tie on
anychange while controlling for roundlost. However, these regressions were not statistically significant,
indicating that ξ depends heavily on other factors – such as round loss and learning effects. ε in the
Robson-Whitehead model refers to the magnitude of the adjustments players make when they adjust
strategies. This idea can be approximated by the average number of changes a player makes when making
at least one change for their strategy – in other words, the average value of changesmade when
anychange=1. This value is 3.94 in rounds 10-24 and 2.25 in rounds 25-30. This would imply that people
change between 13% and 23% of their rankings when altering their strategies in this game.
It is important to note for both ξ and ε that the conditions of this experiment differ from that in
the model in a few key ways. First, observations occur in pairs in this experiment, meaning that subjects
always must react to a minimum of two observations instead of one. As such, isolating the effect a single
observation has on a change in ranking is difficult, which may explain the insignificance observed on the tie
variable. Second, the controlled environment limits the number of payoffs and ranking options, effectively
forcing subjects to create a step-wise utility function with only four steps. This means that the magnitudes
of the shifts likely will have different magnitudes under different conditions. One important note from the
findings of these ε values is that people adjust not just the recently observed rankings when they change
strategies. Observations of high-valued payoffs might result in a series of changes at multiple points along
the utility curve.
Despite the controlled nature of the experiment, participants varied heavily in the ways they
played the game. The demographic survey failed to find noticeable differences that correlated with how
people played the game, though this likely relates to the small sample size. The only statistically significant
observation lies in the relationship between gender and player type, with women evenly distributing across
both player types and men predominantly falling into type 1. It is possible that with a larger sample size
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specific fields of study (individual majors) might drive some of this division. The distinction between player
types likely captures an understanding effect where type 1 players understand the full game much better
than type 2 or type 3 players. This distinction allows us to potentially separate the more strategy-aware
players that have comprehensive strategies from those who need positive or negative stimulus to determine
good or bad strategies. Given enough time, it is likely that type 2 players would eventually reach similar
patterns of play as type 1 players. It is worth noting, however, that by round 35 only four of of the type 2
players retained no irrational rankings. Specifically, the number of irrationalities actually increases as the
treatment progresses. This number is driven by over adjustments as they focus on payoffs that were
recently selected while ignoring other potentially selected pairs. Despite adapting considerably, these
players seem to have never arrived at a comprehensive strategy or understanding of the game.
The success of individuals can be defined by how close they can come to the best rankings in
rounds 1-10 and how well they shift from this strategy towards the optimal strategy in rounds 11-35. In the
pretreatment round, many participants ranked the payoffs in a non optimal manner, even after identifying
the correct strategy. The majority of participants showed greater levels of aversion towards the lowest
payoffs than attraction towards higher payoffs. This trend in rankings suggests that people hold preferences
in the game that are external to optimal play. In the open ended questions, several participants identify the
correct strategy but also express their intention to avoid the lowest payoffs at all costs. Despite these initial
preferences, participants nearly universally began changing their rankings once the treatment probabilities
took place and the effect of the aversion to the lowest payments lessens.
The aversion many participants held towards the lowest payoffs presents a question towards
individuals’ ability to adapt better in the high or the low treatment. Although average expected utility is
closer to optimal in the low treatment, most participants were predisposed to put fewer payoffs in the lower
rankings. As such, it took a larger number of ranking changes to reach the optimal strategy in the high
treatment than in the low treatment. No participants managed to reach a completely optimal set of
rankings in the treatment rounds, but many managed to reach levels of expected utility within just a few
cents of the maximum possible EU. Players consistently shifted the payoffs that are selected more
frequently which also have the largest effect on expected utility when shifted. People seem to generally
make broader or more impactful adjustments quickly but are either slow to make or simply never enact the
smaller fine-tuning adjustments in strategy. An extended version of this game with more rounds would
provide better insight into the long-term adaptability of players.
6.2 Limitations
This study was run as an undergraduate thesis and could not be extended in duration or funding
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past what it accomplished. Nevertheless, the data reveal several meaningful trends in how individuals learn
and craft strategies as they play a game. The use of fixed effects regressions allow for a larger number of
observations from a smaller sample size, providing more insight into round to round behavior. A larger
sample size for participants could give greater significance to analysis. Incentivizing participants with larger
payoffs might incentivize faster or more precise adaptation over the course of the game.
The experiments were scheduled to run at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, which
necessitated a shift to online versions of all experimental software. Allowing participants to connect from
their own homes posed a special set of challenges, as idle participants are much more difficult to reach in an
online setting and the rate for no-shows and disconnects is much higher in an online format. Extending the
playtime of the experiment was not possible due to the risk of subjects becoming bored or distracted over
time. Repeating this experiment in a physical lab might provide different results and enable more flexibility
in its structure and length.
Modifications on the experimental design in future studies could provide more information on
participant behavior in these conditions. More treatment groups would allow for a wider variety of
probability distributions to be used in order to test individual reactions to shifts towards average or other
potential probability distributions. Additional tests that include changes in the quantity of both categories
and payoffs would allow for a better understanding of ξ and ε values. The level of information given to
participants could also be manipulated to see if more or less info on probability distributions affects how
people adapt. Removing the frequency table for which payments have been selected thus far would test how
well people learn when provided less information. Altering the level of punishment assigned to errors
occurring would help identify the difference between the fear of tying and the general learning process.
Finally, using some form of preference elicitation could provide greater insight into how susceptible
individual utility is towards changes in the probabilities and create a structure closer to the one described
in the Robson-Whitehead model.
7. Conclusions
This study finds that people adapt to new circumstances but respond most strongly to negative
experiences. Adaptation occurs most strongly when the punishment for not adapting is strongest, but
people are still able to capture very small changes in expected utility when facing a small probability of a
loss. The change in participants’ aversion to the low payoffs over the course of the game suggests that
individual utility, or happiness, depends in part on their experiences in the game.
Despite the simplified nature of the experiment, the findings support the theoretical models
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underpinning evolutionary game theory where individuals adapt their rankings to account for frequency of
observation. Though based on empirical findings, the empirical models describe general trends in behavior
without attempting to identify specific values or probabilities. As more specifics become known about these
important values, it becomes possible both to verify the accuracy of adaptive utility models in general and
to fine-tune them to give them more predictive capability. The results from this experiment indicate that
the probability of changing strategy depends on learning effects and experiencing a loss, as well as that
individuals make changes to multiple preferences after a single observation. People typically are content to
leave their strategy unchanged unless motivated to change by either incurring a loss or repeatedly observing
a trend in the selections over several rounds.
An understanding of adaptive utility provides more information on how individuals’ well-being
might change over time under different life conditions. Happiness often represents the ultimate goal of a
policy or initiative; programs designed to increase the well-being of the populace may target aggregate
individual happiness or quality of life. The greater the understanding of human happiness and, more
importantly, how happiness levels respond to changes in life conditions the greater effectiveness that we can
gain when setting goals for projects. These models, along with empirical findings, suggest that people’s
perception of happiness (or utility) at least partially depends on their environment, supporting the claim
that people eventually return to average happiness levels after significant life changes. The findings of this
study give insight as to the rate at which this adaptive process occurs and set the groundwork for further
studies to be run investigating the conditions in which people’s preferences adapt.
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Table 18: Average rankings in the high treatment for type 1 players
Table 19: Average rankings in the high treatment for type 2 players
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Table 20: Average rankings in the low treatment for type 1 players
Table 21: Average rankings in the low treatment for type 2 players
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Table 22: Probit regression on any changes being made with colleges as controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
anychange anychange anychange anychange anychange
roundlost 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
type2 -0.502 -0.502 0.746 -0.281 0.746
(0.375) (0.375) (0.399) (0.497) (0.399)
tie 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
tietype2 -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
lateround -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗
(0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870)
earlyround 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880)
female 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.455 1.013∗∗
(0.364) (0.364) (0.364) (0.364) (0.357)
Treatment 1.355∗ 2.688∗∗∗ 0.106 1.355∗ 1.440∗
(0.545) (0.561) (0.453) (0.545) (0.574)
BCLA 1.333∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗
(0.352) (0.355)
SOE 1.248∗ 1.585∗
(0.536) (0.626)
math -0.221
(0.331)
CBA -0.221
(0.331)
CFA -0.380
(0.323)
CSE 0.337
(0.321)
cons -2.063∗∗∗ -3.396∗∗∗ -2.063∗∗∗ -2.063∗∗∗ -3.733∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.515) (0.499) (0.499) (0.609)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848
pseudo R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240
chi2 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5
p 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 23: Probit regression that includes self-identified characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
anychange anychange anychange anychange anychange anychange anychange anychange
roundlost 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
type2 1.754∗∗∗ -0.470 1.198∗∗∗ 3.935∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.276∗
(0.377) (0.599) (0.320) (0.970) (0.377) (0.321) (0.377) (0.597)
tie 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
tietype2 -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
lateround -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗
(0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870)
earlyround 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880)
female 1.788∗∗∗ 0.676 1.232∗∗∗ 0.698 -0.436 1.042∗∗ 0.296 1.758∗
(0.386) (0.365) (0.331) (0.375) (0.607) (0.330) (0.362) (0.840)
treatment -0.920∗∗ -2.032∗∗∗ -0.920∗∗ -3.101∗∗∗ -4.256∗∗∗ -0.174 -0.920∗∗ -1.587∗∗
(0.343) (0.494) (0.343) (0.801) (1.119) (0.384) (0.343) (0.576)
Risktaking 1.112∗∗ 1.161∗
(0.355) (0.475)
Minval 0.556∗∗ 0.438∗
(0.177) (0.219)
Content -1.090∗∗ -1.657∗
(0.362) (0.789)
Wantchange 1.112∗∗ -0.925∗
(0.355) (0.424)
Detailorient 0.746∗∗∗ 1.033
(0.175) (0.570)
Perfectionist 0.497∗∗∗ -0.803
(0.117) (0.549)
cons -2.044∗∗∗ -2.044∗∗∗ -3.156∗∗∗ 2.317 -0.932∗ -4.282∗∗∗ -2.542∗∗∗ 0.488
(0.450) (0.450) (0.685) (1.319) (0.433) (0.829) (0.512) (1.502)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848
pseudo R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240
chi2 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5
p 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 24: Probit regression on anychange with education/majors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
roundlost 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
type2 1.754∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗
(0.377) (0.377) (0.377) (0.377) (0.377) (0.377) (0.377) (0.377) (0.377)
tie 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
tietype2 -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
lateround -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗
(0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870)
earlyround 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880)
female 1.788∗∗∗ 0.676 1.788∗∗∗ 1.788∗∗∗ 1.788∗∗∗ 1.788∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗ 0.455 1.078∗∗
(0.386) (0.365) (0.386) (0.386) (0.386) (0.386) (0.369) (0.364) (0.369)
treatment -0.920∗∗ -2.032∗∗∗ -0.920∗∗ -0.920∗∗ -2.253∗∗∗ -0.920∗∗ -0.920∗∗ -2.253∗∗∗ -2.253∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.494) (0.343) (0.343) (0.492) (0.343) (0.343) (0.492) (0.492)
BCLA 1.112∗∗ 1.112∗∗
(0.355) (0.355)
SOE 2.256∗∗∗ 2.658∗∗∗
(0.523) (0.622)
SFTV -1.112∗∗
(0.355)
CBA -1.333∗∗∗ -0.221
(0.352) (0.331)
CFA -1.492∗∗∗ -0.380
(0.350) (0.323)
CSE -0.710∗ 0.402
(0.357) (0.335)
math -1.333∗∗∗
(0.352)
cons -2.044∗∗∗ -0.932∗ -2.044∗∗∗ -2.044∗∗∗ -0.711 -2.044∗∗∗ -1.334∗∗ 0.622 -1.113∗
(0.450) (0.433) (0.450) (0.450) (0.432) (0.450) (0.436) (0.648) (0.548)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848
pseudo R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240
chi2 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5
p 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 25: Probit regression on anychange including different race variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
anychange anychange anychange anychange anychange anychange
roundlost 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
type2 1.754∗∗∗ 0.642 0.521 1.754∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.633∗∗
(0.377) (0.354) (0.422) (0.377) (0.377) (0.553)
tie 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
tietype2 -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
lateround -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗
(0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870)
earlyround 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0880)
female 1.788∗∗∗ 0.676 1.788∗∗∗ 0.676 1.788∗∗∗ 0.676
(0.386) (0.365) (0.386) (0.365) (0.386) (0.365)
treatment -2.412∗∗∗ -0.920∗∗ 0.313 -0.920∗∗ -0.920∗∗ -2.291∗∗∗
(0.491) (0.343) (0.540) (0.343) (0.343) (0.635)
asian -1.492∗∗∗ -1.961∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.544)
white 1.112∗∗ -0.469
(0.355) (0.419)
black -1.233∗ -0.590
(0.557) (0.532)
hispanic -1.112∗∗ -1.581∗∗
(0.355) (0.547)
natamerican 0.363 -2.710∗∗∗
(0.541) (0.761)
cons -0.552 -0.932∗ -2.044∗∗∗ -0.932∗ -2.044∗∗∗ 1.028
(0.432) (0.433) (0.450) (0.433) (0.450) (0.698)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848 1848
pseudo R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240
chi2 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5 393.5
p 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50 1.60e-50
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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1   cap log close
2   clear
3   
4   *********Appendix B
5   *********Do-file 1: summarizing statistics and initial organization
6   
7   **** Cameron Bellamoroso
8   **** 9/18/2020
9   **** Senior Thesis
10   
11   *This file cleans the data, generates new variables, and runs preliminary summary 
12   *statistics and regressions. At the end it creates the data set used by do-file 2.
13   
14   cd "D:\Work\Thesis\Data\Analysiscd"
15   log using ThesisAnalysis.txt, replace
16   use Datamaster_rebuilt1
17   
18   **note that round 11 was skipped on accident in the code, and round 34 is then overwritten, 
meaning data from this round was manually repopulated using the GSF files from each 
experiment.
19   
20   ***Dropping useless variables:
21   cap drop Period
22   cap drop Group
23   cap drop test1
24   cap drop test2
25   cap drop test3
26   
27   ***Generating new useful variables
28   
29   * Tie[period] is 1 if a tie occurred
30   forval k = 1/35{
31   
32   cap drop tie`k'
33   gen tie`k' = 0
34   replace tie`k'=1 if tier1`k'==tier2`k'
35   local j=`k'+1
36   gen prevtie`j'=0
37   replace prevtie`j'=1 if tier1`k'==tier2`k'
38   }
39   
40   
41   
42   * Earnings captured:
43   gen earnings = roundpay1+roundpay2+roundpay3+roundpay4+roundpay5+roundpay6+roundpay7+
roundpay8+roundpay9+roundpay10+roundpay11+roundpay12+roundpay13+roundpay14+roundpay15+
roundpay16+roundpay17+roundpay18+roundpay19+roundpay20+roundpay21+roundpay22+roundpay23+
roundpay24+roundpay25+roundpay26+roundpay27+roundpay28+roundpay29+roundpay30+roundpay31+
roundpay32+roundpay33+roundpay34+roundpay35
44   gen maxearnings = 0
45   forval i = 1/35{
46   replace maxearnings=maxearnings+activevar1`i' if activevar1`i'>activevar2`i'
47   replace maxearnings=maxearnings+activevar2`i' if activevar1`i'<activevar2`i'
48   }
49   
50   
51   cap drop endgameearnings
52   cap drop earningshare
53   cap drop earlygameearnings
54   cap drop endgamemax
55   cap drop earlygamemax
56   gen earningshare = earnings/maxearnings
57   gen endgameearnings = 0
58   gen earlygameearnings = 0
59   gen endgamemax=0
60   gen earlygamemax=0
61   
62   forval i = 11/20{
63   replace earlygameearnings = earlygameearnings + roundpay`i'
64   replace earlygamemax=earlygamemax+activevar1`i' if activevar1`i'>activevar2`i'
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65   replace earlygamemax=earlygamemax+activevar2`i' if activevar1`i'<activevar2`i'
66   }
67   forval i = 26/35{
68   replace endgameearnings = endgameearnings + roundpay`i'
69   replace endgamemax=endgamemax+activevar1`i' if activevar1`i'>activevar2`i'
70   replace endgamemax=endgamemax+activevar2`i' if activevar1`i'<activevar2`i'
71   }
72   replace earlygameearnings = earlygameearnings/earlygamemax
73   replace endgameearnings = endgameearnings/endgamemax
74   
75   ** dummy for losing the previous round
76   
77   forval i=2/35{
78   gen lostround`i'=0
79   local j=`i'-1
80   replace lostround`i'=1 if activevar1`j'>=roundpay`j' & activevar2`j'>=roundpay`j'
81   }
82   
83   *Generate changestrategy which logs how many changes people make in their rankings each round
84   
85   forval i = 2/35{
86   cap drop rankingchanges`i'
87   gen rankingchanges`i'=0
88   local k = `i'-1
89   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
90   replace rankingchanges`i'=rankingchanges`i'+1 if `j'Tier`i'!=`j'Tier`k'
91   }
92   }
93   *Creating a variable that shows the average number of times a person changes rank
94   gen avgrankchange_pretreat=0
95   forval i = 2/10{
96   replace avgrankchange_pretreat = avgrankchange_pretreat + rankingchanges`i'
97   }
98   replace avgrankchange_pretreat = avgrankchange_pretreat/9
99   
100   gen avgrankchange_posttreat=0
101   forval i = 11/35{
102   replace avgrankchange_posttreat = avgrankchange_posttreat + rankingchanges`i'
103   }
104   replace avgrankchange_posttreat = avgrankchange_posttreat/25
105   
106   *Generating a variable that counts how many payoffs have been given each ranking per round
107   
108   forval i = 1/35{
109   cap drop binsize1`i'
110   cap drop binsize2`i'
111   cap drop binsize3`i'
112   cap drop binsize4`i'
113   gen binsize1`i'=0
114   gen binsize2`i'=0
115   gen binsize3`i'=0
116   gen binsize4`i'=0
117   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
118   replace binsize1`i'=binsize1`i'+1 if `j'Tier`i'==1
119   replace binsize2`i'=binsize2`i'+1 if `j'Tier`i'==2
120   replace binsize3`i'=binsize3`i'+1 if `j'Tier`i'==3
121   replace binsize4`i'=binsize4`i'+1 if `j'Tier`i'==4
122   }
123   }
124   
125   
126   
127   *Trying to identify types of players:
128   cap drop playtype
129   gen playtype=0
130   
131   ** coutning how many rounds of irrational play occur
132   cap drop irrationalroundcount
133   gen irrationalroundcount = 1
134   gen irrationalround1=0
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135   forval i = 2/35{
136   gen irrationalround`i'=0
137   replace irrationalroundcount = irrationalroundcount+1 if ATier`i'>BTier`i' | BTier`i'>CTier
`i'| CTier`i'>DTier`i' | DTier`i'>ETier`i' | ETier`i'>FTier`i' | FTier`i'>GTier`i' | GTier
`i'>HTier`i' | HTier`i'>ITier`i' | ITier`i'>JTier`i'|JTier`i'>KTier`i' | KTier`i'>LTier`i' |
LTier`i'>MTier`i'| MTier`i'>NTier`i' | NTier`i'>OTier`i' | OTier`i'>PTier`i' | PTier`i'>
QTier`i'
138   replace irrationalround`i'=1 if ATier`i'>BTier`i' | BTier`i'>CTier`i'| CTier`i'>DTier`i' |
DTier`i'>ETier`i' | ETier`i'>FTier`i' | FTier`i'>GTier`i' | GTier`i'>HTier`i' | HTier`i'>
ITier`i' | ITier`i'>JTier`i'|JTier`i'>KTier`i' | KTier`i'>LTier`i' |LTier`i'>MTier`i'| MTier
`i'>NTier`i' | NTier`i'>OTier`i' | OTier`i'>PTier`i' | PTier`i'>QTier`i'
139   }
140   
141   
142   * type 1 if the person always has a rational ranking system -- no reversals. Indicates a 
theoretical understanding of the game.
143   replace playtype=1 if irrationalroundcount<4
144   
145   * Type 3s are excluded from many of the regressions -- they exhibit a lack of understanding 
and adaptation to the game throughout all rounds.  They are defined by having their lowest 
payoff ranked highly and their highest payoff ranked low in late rounds of the experiment.
146   
147   replace playtype=3 if ATier35>1 & Treatment == 0
148   
149   replace playtype=3 if QTier35 <4 & Treatment == 1
150   
151   *reassigning outliers based on data trends and responses in chat
152   replace playtype=3 if avgrankchange_posttreat>9
153   
154   
155   *type 2 plays doesn't play universally rationally but does adapt and learn over the course 
of the game, either reaching a rational ranking or showing signs of responding to the trial 
and error approach.
156   replace playtype=2 if playtype==0
157   
158   
159   
160   ** general info:
161   replace sex = . if sex==0
162   replace ethnic = . if ethnic==0
163   replace age = . if age==0
164   
165   
166   
167   
168   
169   *************************************************************
170   
171   ***Summarizing statistics
172   
173   
174   
175   
176   **looking at earnings based on player types
177   sum earlygameearnings if playtype==1
178   sum earlygameearnings if playtype==2
179   sum endgameearnings if playtype==1
180   sum endgameearnings if playtype==2
181   *note no difference seems significant
182   
183   
184   * generating a matrix that has the average rankings for each payoff in rounds 1-10
185   * The two tables seperate the player types
186   matrix pretreatsum1 = J(17,10,.)
187   matrix pretreatsum2 = J(17,10,.)
188   {
189   local col = 1
190   foreach i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10{
191   local row = 1
192   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
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193   
194   summarize `j'Tier`i' if playtype==1
195   mat pretreatsum1[`row',`col'] = r(median)
196   summarize `j'Tier`i' if playtype==2
197   mat pretreatsum2 [`row', `col'] = r(median)
198   local row = `row' + 1
199   }
200   local col = `col' + 1
201   }
202   matrix rownames pretreatsum1 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
203   matrix colnames pretreatsum1 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10
204   matrix rownames pretreatsum2 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
205   matrix colnames pretreatsum2 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10
206   }
207   
208   
209   
210   
211   
212   * Generating tables that show the behavior in posttreatment rounds between playertypes and 
treatment groups.
213   {
214   matrix posttreatsum1_treat1 = J(17,35,.)
215   matrix posttreatsum2_treat1 = J(17,35,.)
216   matrix posttreatsum1_treat0 = J(17,35,.)
217   matrix posttreatsum2_treat0 = J(17,35,.)
218   
219   local col = 1
220   forval i = 1/35{
221   local row = 1
222   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
223   summarize `j'Tier`i' if Treatment & playtype==1, detail
224   mat posttreatsum1_treat1[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
225   
226   summarize `j'Tier`i' if Treatment & playtype==2, detail
227   mat posttreatsum2_treat1[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
228   
229   summarize `j'Tier`i' if !Treatment & playtype==1, detail
230   mat posttreatsum1_treat0[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
231   
232   summarize `j'Tier`i' if !Treatment & playtype==2, detail
233   mat posttreatsum2_treat0[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
234   
235   local row = `row' + 1
236   }
237   local col = `col' + 1
238   }
239   
240   matrix rownames posttreatsum1_treat0 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
241   matrix colnames posttreatsum1_treat0 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15
r16 r17 r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
242   
243   matrix rownames posttreatsum1_treat1 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
244   matrix colnames posttreatsum1_treat1 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15
r16 r17 r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
245   
246   matrix rownames posttreatsum2_treat0 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
247   matrix colnames posttreatsum2_treat0 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15
r16 r17 r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
248   
249   matrix rownames posttreatsum2_treat1 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
250   matrix colnames posttreatsum2_treat1 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15
r16 r17 r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
251   }
252   
253   
254   
255   
256   
257   matrix posttreatmed1_treat1 = J(17,35,.)
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258   matrix posttreatmed2_treat1 = J(17,35,.)
259   matrix posttreatmed1_treat0 = J(17,35,.)
260   matrix posttreatmed2_treat0 = J(17,35,.)
261   
262   
263   * Trying this again with medians
264   local col = 1
265   
266   forval i=1/35{
267   local row = 1
268   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
269   sort Treatment playtype `j'Tier`i'
270   
271   mat posttreatmed1_treat1[`row',`col'] = `j'Tier`i'[45]
272   mat posttreatmed1_treat0[`row',`col'] = `j'Tier`i'[10]
273   mat posttreatmed2_treat0[`row',`col'] = ((`j'Tier`i'[25]+`j'Tier`i'[26])/2)
274   mat posttreatmed2_treat1[`row',`col'] = `j'Tier`i'[59]
275   local row = `row'+1
276   }
277   local col= `col'+1
278   }
279   {
280   matrix rownames posttreatmed1_treat0 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
281   matrix colnames posttreatmed1_treat0 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15
r16 r17 r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
282   
283   matrix rownames posttreatmed1_treat1 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
284   matrix colnames posttreatmed1_treat1 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15
r16 r17 r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
285   
286   matrix rownames posttreatmed2_treat0 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
287   matrix colnames posttreatmed2_treat0 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15
r16 r17 r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
288   
289   matrix rownames posttreatmed2_treat1 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
290   matrix colnames posttreatmed2_treat1 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15
r16 r17 r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
291   }
292   esttab matrix(posttreatmed1_treat1, fmt(%8.2g)) using treat1rankmed_type1.xls, title(Median
Rankings) replace
293   esttab matrix(posttreatmed2_treat1, fmt(%8.2g)) using treat1rankmed_type2.xls, title(Median
rankings) replace
294   esttab matrix(posttreatmed1_treat0, fmt(%8.2g)) using treat0rankmed_type1.xls, title(Median
rankings) replace
295   esttab matrix(posttreatmed2_treat0, fmt(%8.2g)) using treat0rankmed_type2.xls, title(Median
rankings) replace
296   
297   
298   
299   ** listing out the summary matrices
300   
301   
302   
303   
304   ** making a matrix to summarize how many times people change rankings per round on average
305   matrix rankingchanges_pretreat = J(4,9,.)
306   gen avgrankchange110=0
307   local col = 1
308   foreach i in 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10{
309   local row = 1
310   replace avgrankchange110=avgrankchange110+rankingchanges`i'
311   foreach j in 1 2{
312   summarize rankingchanges`i' if playtype==`j'
313   mat rankingchanges_pretreat[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
314   local row = `row' + 1
315   mat rankingchanges_pretreat[`row',`col'] = r(sd)
316   local row = `row'+1
317   }
318   local col = `col' + 1
319   }
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320   replace avgrankchange110=avgrankchange110/9
321   matrix rownames rankingchanges_pretreat = Type1_mean Type1_sd Type2_mean Type2_sd
322   matrix colnames rankingchanges_pretreat = r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10
323   gen avgrankchange1124=0
324   gen avgrankchange2535=0
325   matrix rankingchanges_posttreat = J(4,25,.)
326   local col = 1
327   forval i = 11/35{
328   local row = 1
329   replace avgrankchange1124=avgrankchange1124+rankingchanges`i' if `i'<25
330   replace avgrankchange2535=avgrankchange2535+rankingchanges`i' if `i'>24
331   foreach j in 1 2{
332   summarize rankingchanges`i' if playtype==`j'
333   mat rankingchanges_posttreat[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
334   local row = `row' + 1
335   mat rankingchanges_posttreat[`row',`col'] = r(sd)
336   local row = `row' + 1
337   }
338   local col = `col' + 1
339   }
340   replace avgrankchange1124=avgrankchange1124/14
341   replace avgrankchange2535=avgrankchange2535/11
342   matrix rownames rankingchanges_posttreat = Type1_mean Type1_sd Type2_mean Type2_sd
343   matrix colnames rankingchanges_posttreat = r11 r12 r13 r14 r15 r16 r17 r18 r19 r20 r21 r22
r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
344   
345   matrix list pretreatsum1, format(%8.2f)
346   matrix list pretreatsum2, format(%8.2f)
347   
348   matrix list posttreatsum1_treat1, format(%8.2f)
349   matrix list posttreatsum2_treat1, format(%8.2f)
350   matrix list posttreatsum1_treat0, format(%8.2f)
351   matrix list posttreatsum2_treat0, format(%8.2f)
352   matrix list rankingchanges_pretreat, format(%8.2f)
353   matrix list rankingchanges_posttreat, format(%8.2f)
354   
355   ttest avgrankchange110==avgrankchange1124
356   ttest avgrankchange2535==avgrankchange1124
357   ttest avgrankchange110==avgrankchange2535
358   
359   tab age
360   tab sex
361   tab ethnic
362   
363   tab cfirstmajor
364   tab firstmajor
365   tab secondmajor
366   
367   tab avgrankchange_posttreat playtype
368   
369   tab sex playtype, exact
370   tab sex cfirstmajor, exact
371   tab cfirstmajor playtype, exact
372   
373   
374   
375   
376   
377   
378   
379   
380   
381   
382   esttab matrix(rankingchanges_pretreat, fmt(%8.2g)) using rankchange_pretreat.tex, title(
Pretreatment rankings) replace
383   esttab matrix(rankingchanges_posttreat, fmt(%8.2g)) using rankchange_posttreat.tex, title(
Pretreatment rankings) replace
384   
385   esttab matrix(pretreatsum1, fmt(%8.2g)) using pretreatranksummary1.xls, title(Pretreatment
rankings for type 1) replace
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386   esttab matrix(pretreatsum2, fmt(%8.2g)) using pretreatranksummary2.xls, title(Pretreatment
rankings for type 2) replace
387   
388   
389   esttab matrix(posttreatsum1_treat1, fmt(%8.2g)) using treat1ranksum_type1.xls, title(
Pretreatment rankings) replace
390   esttab matrix(posttreatsum2_treat1, fmt(%8.2g)) using treat1ranksum_type2.xls, title(
Pretreatment rankings) replace
391   esttab matrix(posttreatsum1_treat0, fmt(%8.2g)) using treat0ranksum_type1.xls, title(
Pretreatment rankings) replace
392   esttab matrix(posttreatsum2_treat0, fmt(%8.2g)) using treat0ranksum_type2.xls, title(
Pretreatment rankings) replace
393   
394   
395   
396   save "D:\Work\Thesis\Data\Analysiscd\Thesisdata2.dta", replace
397   
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1   cap log close
2   clear
3   
4   *********Appendix B
5   *********Do-file 2: transposing data
6   
7   **** Cameron Bellamoroso
8   **** 9/18/2020
9   **** Senior Thesis
10   
11   *This file transposes the data to prepare it for fixed effects regressions and continues to 
sort and organize some variables. At 
12   *the end it creates the data file called "Thesisdata3", which is used in do-file 3
13   
14   cd "D:\Work\Thesis\Data\Analysiscd"
15   log using Thesisregressions.txt, replace
16   use Thesisdata2
17   
18   
19   
20   ** Making the data suitable to run the fixed effects regressions
21   
22   gen id = _n
23   expand=35
24   sort id
25   
26   set obs 2275
27   egen round = fill(1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35)
28   
29   ** this generates new variables as destinations as I transpose
30   foreach i in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
31   gen rank`i'=-1
32   gen selectedcount`i'=-1
33   }
34   gen roundearnings=-1
35   gen selectedpayoff1=-1
36   gen selectedpayoff2=-1
37   gen tieoccurs=-1
38   gen changesmade=-1
39   gen category1size=-1
40   gen category2size=-1
41   gen category3size=-1
42   gen category4size=-1
43   gen timerankround=-1
44   gen timepayround=-1
45   gen prevtieoccurs=-1
46   gen roundlost=-1
47   gen irraround=-1
48   
49   ** Moves all variables into columns instead of rows
50   gen rankingchanges1=0
51   forval i = 1/35{
52   
53   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
54   replace rank`j'=`j'Tier`i' if round==`i'
55   replace selectedcount`j'=`j'count`i' if round==`i'
56   }
57   replace roundearnings=roundpay`i' if round==`i'
58   replace selectedpayoff1=activevar1`i' if round==`i'
59   replace selectedpayoff2=activevar2`i' if round==`i'
60   replace tieoccurs=tie`i' if round==`i'
61   local j=`i'+1
62   replace prevtieoccurs=prevtie`j' if round==`j'
63   replace changesmade=rankingchanges`i' if round==`i'
64   replace category1size=binsize1`i' if round==`i'
65   replace category2size=binsize2`i' if round==`i'
66   replace category3size=binsize3`i' if round==`i'
67   replace category4size=binsize4`i' if round==`i'
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68   replace irraround=irrationalround`i' if round==`i'
69   if `i'!=1{
70   replace roundlost=lostround`i' if round==`i'
71   }
72   }
73   replace prevtieoccurs=0 if round==1
74   replace roundlost=0 if round==1
75   forval i=1/10{
76   replace timerankround=TimeOKRankingRound`i'OK if round==`i'
77   replace timepayround=TimeOKRankingRound`i'OK if round==`i'
78   }
79   forval i=1/25{
80   replace timerankround=TimeOKTreatrank`i'OK if round==`i'
81   replace timepayround=TimeOKTreatpay`i'OK if round==`i'
82   }
83   
84   
85   ** drops all the old variables
86   forval i=1/35{
87   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
88   cap drop `j'Tier`i'
89   cap drop `j'count`i'
90   }
91   cap drop roundpay`i'
92   cap drop activevar`i'
93   cap drop activevar1`i'
94   cap drop activevar2`i'
95   cap drop tie`i'
96   cap drop rankingchanges`i'
97   cap drop binsize1`i'
98   cap drop binsize2`i'
99   cap drop binsize3`i'
100   cap drop binsize4`i'
101   cap drop tier1`i'
102   cap drop tier2`i'
103   cap drop TimeOKRankingRound`i'OK
104   cap drop TimeOKPayingRound`i'OK
105   cap drop TimeOKTreatrank`i'OK
106   cap drop TimeOKTreatpay`i'OK
107   cap drop prevtie`i'
108   cap drop irrationalround`i'
109   cap drop lostround`i'
110   }
111   cap drop A
112   rename tieoccurs tie
113   
114   
115   ** generating a variable for the probabilities in treatment
116   
117   gen treatpA = .004 if Treatment==1
118   gen treatpB = .005 if Treatment==1
119   gen treatpC = .006 if Treatment==1
120   gen treatpD = .007 if Treatment==1
121   gen treatpE = .009 if Treatment==1
122   gen treatpF = .012 if Treatment==1
123   gen treatpG = .014 if Treatment==1
124   gen treatpH = .017 if Treatment==1
125   gen treatpI = .021 if Treatment==1
126   gen treatpJ = .028 if Treatment==1
127   gen treatpK = .035 if Treatment==1
128   gen treatpL = .05 if Treatment==1
129   gen treatpM = .075 if Treatment==1
130   gen treatpN = .11 if Treatment==1
131   gen treatpO = .152 if Treatment==1
132   gen treatpP = .2 if Treatment==1
133   gen treatpQ = .255 if Treatment==1
134   
135   replace treatpA = .255 if Treatment==0
136   replace treatpB = .2 if Treatment==0
137   replace treatpC = .152 if Treatment==0
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138   replace treatpD = .11 if Treatment==0
139   replace treatpE = .075 if Treatment==0
140   replace treatpF = .05 if Treatment==0
141   replace treatpG = .035 if Treatment==0
142   replace treatpH = .028 if Treatment==0
143   replace treatpI = .021 if Treatment==0
144   replace treatpJ = .017 if Treatment==0
145   replace treatpK = .014 if Treatment==0
146   replace treatpL = .012 if Treatment==0
147   replace treatpM = .009 if Treatment==0
148   replace treatpN = .007 if Treatment==0
149   replace treatpO = .006 if Treatment==0
150   replace treatpP = .005 if Treatment==0
151   replace treatpQ = .004 if Treatment==0
152   
153   gen pretreatp = 1/17
154   
155   ** generating the values of payoffs:
156   local i = 0
157   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
158   gen `j'val = 0
159   replace `j'val = 60+50*`i'
160   local i = `i'+1
161   }
162   
163   cap drop expectedutility
164   ** generating a new variable to capture expected utility
165   gen expectedutility = 0
166   * each letter corresponds to a different payoff -- A is the lowest, Q the highest
167   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
168   foreach i in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
169   ** generate a local for whether a payoff combo has been used so far -- later we will make 
sure that payoffs are only used once in the sum
170   if `i'val != `j'val{
171   ** these are the sum terms that check to see the ranking relationship that is present
172   ** each if statement corresponds to a different possible state for each pair of rankings, 
then adds the sum
173   ** rank`j' is the ranking a person assigned to payoff `j' in each given round
174   ** treatp`i' is the probability of payment `i' to be chosen
175   ** `i'val is the value of payoff `i'
176   replace expectedutility = expectedutility + (treatp`i'*treatp`j'/(1-treatp`i')*(`i'val+`j'
val)/2) if rank`j'==rank`i'
177   replace expectedutility = expectedutility + (treatp`i'*treatp`j'/(1-treatp`i')*`j'val) if
rank`j'>rank`i'
178   replace expectedutility = expectedutility + (treatp`i'*treatp`j'/(1-treatp`i')*`i'val) if
rank`j'<rank`i'
179   ** this records which pair was just used
180   ** end of if "do" loop
181   
182   ** end of loop that checks if its the same payoff twice
183   }
184   ** end of i loop
185   }
186   ** end of j loop
187   }
188   
189   
190   
191   ** now repeated for the pretreatment rounds:
192   replace expectedutility=0 if round<11
193   foreach j in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
194   foreach i in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q{
195   
196   ** generate a local for whether a payoff combo has been used so far -- later we will make 
sure that payoffs are only used once in the sum
197   if `i'val !=`j'val{
198   
199   ** these are the sum terms that check to see the ranking relationship that is present
200   ** each if statement corresponds to a different possible state for each pair of rankings, 
then adds the sum
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201   ** rank`j' is the ranking a person assigned to payoff `j' in each given round
202   ** pretreatp is the probability of payment `i' to be chosen
203   ** `i'val is the value of payoff `i'
204   replace expectedutility = expectedutility + (pretreatp*1/16*(`i'val+`j'val)/2) if rank`j'==
rank`i' & round<11
205   replace expectedutility = expectedutility + (pretreatp*1/16*`j'val) if rank`j'>rank`i' &
round<11
206   replace expectedutility = expectedutility + (pretreatp*1/16*`i'val) if rank`j'<rank`i' &
round<11
207   ** this records which pair was just used
208   
209   ** end of loop that checks if its the same pair twice
210   }
211   ** end of i loop
212   }
213   ** end of j loop
214   }
215   ** note that maximum payout value for the high treatment is 
216   ** max payout low treatment is 295.6068
217   ** max payout high treatment is 798.8611
218   ** max pretreatment is 600.8091
219   
220   
221   * just fixing variable names to be more readable
222   cap drop tie
223   rename prevtieoccurs tie
224   
225   *Turning everything into dummy variables
226   rename sex female
227   replace female=female-1
228   
229   
230   ** generates round dummies divided 10 10 15
231   gen lateround=0
232   gen earlyround=0
233   replace lateround=1 if round>23
234   replace earlyround=1 if round<11
235   
236   ** Dummy for race/ethnicity
237   gen white=0
238   replace white=1 if ethnic==3
239   gen asian=0
240   replace asian=1 if ethnic==2
241   gen black=0
242   replace black=1 if ethnic==1
243   gen raceother=0
244   replace raceother=1 if ethnic>5
245   gen hispanic=0
246   replace hispanic=1 if ethnic==4
247   gen natamerican=0
248   replace natamerican=1 if ethnic==5
249   
250   ** dummies for school at lmu
251   gen CBA=0
252   replace CBA=1 if cfirstmajor==1|csecondmajor==1
253   gen CFA=0
254   replace CFA=1 if cfirstmajor==2|csecondmajor==2
255   gen BCLA=0
256   replace BCLA=1 if cfirstmajor==3|csecondmajor==3
257   gen CSE=0
258   replace CSE=1 if cfirstmajor==4|csecondmajor==4
259   gen SFTV=0
260   replace SFTV=1 if cfirstmajor==5|csecondmajor==5
261   gen SOE=0
262   replace SOE=1 if cfirstmajor==6|csecondmajor==6
263   gen othereduc=0
264   replace othereduc=1 if cfirstmajor>6|csecondmajor>6
265   
266   **variable for math-based majors
267   gen math =0
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268   replace math=1 if BCLA==1 & firstmajor==5
269   replace math=1 if CBA==1
270   replace math=1 if CSE==1 & firstmajor==1
271   replace math=1 if CSE==1 & firstmajor==7
272   replace math=1 if CSE==1 & firstmajor==8
273   replace math=1 if CSE==1 & firstmajor==10
274   replace math=1 if CSE==1 & firstmajor==11
275   replace math=1 if CSE==1 & firstmajor==13
276   
277   
278   ** playtype as dummies
279   gen type2=0
280   gen type3=0
281   replace type2=1 if playtype==2
282   replace type3=1 if playtype==3
283   
284   * probability of a change ocurring
285   gen anychange=0
286   replace anychange=1 if changesmade>0
287   
288   **dummy to check for interaction between gender and playtype -- represents women 
289   * who are type 2, making type 1 men the default group
290   cap drop playfemale
291   gen playfemale = female*type2
292   
293   **interaction term for ties and type2s
294   cap drop tietype2
295   gen tietype2=tie*type2
296   
297   **interaction term treatment and type2
298   gen Treatmenttype2 = Treatment*type2
299   
300   
301   
302   
303   
304   
305   
306   
307   
308   order id round Treatment age female ethnic playtype cfirstmajor csecondmajor firstmajor
secondmajor Risktaking Minval Content Wantchange Detailorient, first
309   order Perfectionist changesmade tie roundlost expectedutility rankA rankB rankC rankD rankE
rankF rankG rankH rankI rankJ rankK rankL rankM rankN rankO rankP rankQ, after(Detailorient)
310   
311   save "D:\Work\Thesis\Data\Analysiscd\Thesisdata3.dta", replace
312   
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1   cap log close
2   clear
3   
4   *********Appendix B
5   *********Do-file 3: regressions and analysis
6   
7   **** Cameron Bellamoroso
8   **** 9/18/2020
9   **** Senior Thesis
10   
11   **This do file runs regression analysis, summarizes utility, and looks at the relationship 
between variables.
12   **Most tables are generated at the end of this do-file.
13   
14   cd "D:\Work\Thesis\Data\Analysiscd"
15   log using ThesisAnalysis.txt, replace
16   use Thesisdata3
17   
18   ** generating tables that can show the expectedutility of people as they progress through 
the game:
19   matrix utilitytreat1 = J(3,35,.)
20   matrix utilitytreat0 = J(3,35,.)
21   local row=1
22   local col=1
23   forval i =1/35{
24   if `i'<11{
25   mat utilitytreat1[`row',`col'] = 600.8091
26   }
27   if `i'>10{
28   mat utilitytreat1[`row',`col'] = 798.8611
29   }
30   local row = `row'+1
31   sum expectedutility if Treatment==1 & type2 & round==`i'
32   mat utilitytreat1[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
33   local row = `row'+1
34   sum expectedutility if Treatment==1 & playtype==1 & round==`i'
35   mat utilitytreat1[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
36   
37   
38   
39   local row = 1
40   if `i'<11{
41   mat utilitytreat0[`row',`col'] = 600.8091
42   }
43   if `i'>10{
44   mat utilitytreat0[`row',`col'] = 295.6068
45   }
46   local row = `row'+1
47   sum expectedutility if Treatment==0 & type2 & round==`i'
48   mat utilitytreat0[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
49   local row = `row'+1
50   sum expectedutility if Treatment==0 & playtype==1 & round==`i'
51   mat utilitytreat0[`row',`col'] = r(mean)
52   local row = 1
53   local col = `col'+1
54   }
55   matrix rownames utilitytreat1 = Max_expectedutility Type2Expectedutility Type1Expectedutility
56   matrix colnames utilitytreat1 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15 r16 r17
r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
57   matrix rownames utilitytreat0= Max_expectedutility Type2Expectedutility Type1Expectedutility
58   matrix colnames utilitytreat0 = r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15 r16 r17
r18 r19 r20 r21 r22 r23 r24 r25 r26 r27 r28 r29 r30 r31 r32 r33 r34 r35
59   
60   ** making a table for irrational rounds:
61   tab irraround round if type2 & round<11, matcell(irraround2_pretreat)
62   tab irraround round if type2 & round>10, matcell(irraround2_posttreat)
63   
64   tab irraround round if !type2 & !type3 & round<11, matcell(irraround1_pretreat)
65   tab irraround round if !type2 & !type3 & round>10, matcell(irraround1_posttreat)
66   
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67   ** univariate models?
68   reg changesmade Treatment, r
69   reg changesmade female, r
70   reg changesmade type2, r
71   
72   probit anychange Treatment, r
73   probit anychange female, r
74   probit anychange type2, r
75   
76   ** these are the regressions that use ties as the independent var -- not significant
77   {
78   * trying the same thing with roundlost as the independent var -- more statistical 
significance than with roundlost
79   reg changesmade tie if type3==0, r
80   eststo esty1
81   ** adding fixed effects
82   reg changesmade tie i.id if type3==0, r
83   eststo esty2
84   ** adding control for losing prev round
85   reg changesmade tie roundlost i.id if type3==0, r
86   eststo esty3
87   ** adding control for player type
88   reg changesmade tie type2 i.id if type3==0, r
89   eststo esty4
90   ** control for player type AND lost round
91   reg changesmade tie type2 roundlost i.id if type3==0, r
92   eststo esty5
93   ** add controls for round clusters and removing the first couple rounds
94   reg changesmade tie type2 roundlost lateround earlyround i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
95   eststo esty6
96   ** control for gender (not statistically significant)
97   reg changesmade tie type2 roundlost lateround earlyround Treatment i.id if type3==0 & round>
2, r
98   eststo esty7
99   ** without losing a round
100   reg changesmade tie type2 lateround earlyround female i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
101   eststo esty8
102   ** with treatment control
103   reg changesmade tie type2 roundlost lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if type3==0 &
round>2, r
104   eststo esty9
105   ** 
106   reg changesmade tie type2 roundlost tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if
type3==0 & round>2, r
107   eststo esty10
108   **
109   reg changesmade tie type2 roundlost tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
Treatmenttype2 i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
110   eststo esty11
111   
112   
113   * now checking roundlosts occurring affecting the probit model
114   probit anychange roundlost if type3==0, r
115   eststo esti1
116   ** adding fixed effects
117   probit anychange tie i.id if type3==0, r
118   eststo esti2
119   ** adding control for losing prev round
120   probit anychange tie roundlost i.id if type3==0, r
121   eststo esti3
122   ** adding control for player type
123   probit anychange tie type2 i.id if type3==0, r
124   eststo esti4
125   ** control for player type AND lost round
126   probit anychange tie type2 roundlost i.id if type3==0, r
127   eststo esti5
128   ** add controls for round clusters and removing the first couple rounds
129   probit anychange tie type2 roundlost lateround earlyround i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
130   eststo esti6
131   ** control for gender 
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132   probit anychange tie type2 roundlost lateround earlyround Treatment i.id if type3==0 & round
>2, r
133   eststo esti7
134   ** without losing a round
135   probit anychange tie type2 lateround earlyround female i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
136   eststo esti8
137   ** with treatment control
138   probit anychange tie type2 roundlost lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if type3==0
& round>2, r
139   eststo esti9
140   ** no fixed effects
141   probit anychange tie type2 roundlost tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if
type3==0 & round>2, r
142   eststo esti10
143   
144   
145   }
146   
147   
148   
149   * trying the same thing with roundlost as the independent var -- more statistical 
significance than with roundlost
150   reg changesmade roundlost if type3==0, r
151   eststo esta1
152   ** adding fixed effects
153   reg changesmade roundlost i.id if type3==0, r
154   eststo esta2
155   ** adding control for losing prev round
156   reg changesmade roundlost tie i.id if type3==0, r
157   eststo esta3
158   ** adding control for player type
159   reg changesmade roundlost type2 i.id if type3==0, r
160   eststo esta4
161   ** control for player type AND lost round
162   reg changesmade roundlost type2 tie i.id if type3==0, r
163   eststo esta5
164   ** add controls for round clusters and removing the first couple rounds
165   reg changesmade roundlost type2 tie lateround earlyround i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
166   eststo esta6
167   ** control for gender (not statistically significant)
168   reg changesmade roundlost type2 tie lateround earlyround Treatment i.id if type3==0 & round>
2, r
169   eststo esta7
170   ** without losing a round
171   reg changesmade roundlost type2 lateround earlyround female i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
172   eststo esta8
173   ** with treatment control
174   reg changesmade roundlost type2 tie lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if type3==0 &
round>2, r
175   eststo esta9
176   ** 
177   reg changesmade roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if
type3==0 & round>2, r
178   eststo esta10
179   **
180   reg changesmade roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
Treatmenttype2 i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
181   eststo esta11
182   
183   * now checking roundlosts occurring affecting the probit model
184   probit anychange roundlost if type3==0, r
185   eststo est1
186   ** adding fixed effects
187   probit anychange roundlost i.id if type3==0, r
188   eststo est2
189   ** adding control for losing prev round
190   probit anychange roundlost tie i.id if type3==0, r
191   eststo est3
192   ** adding control for player type
193   probit anychange roundlost type2 i.id if type3==0, r
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194   eststo est4
195   ** control for player type AND lost round
196   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie i.id if type3==0, r
197   eststo est5
198   ** add controls for round clusters and removing the first couple rounds
199   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie lateround earlyround i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
200   eststo est6
201   ** control for gender 
202   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie lateround earlyround Treatment i.id if type3==0 & round
>2, r
203   eststo est7
204   ** without losing a round
205   probit anychange roundlost type2 lateround earlyround female i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
206   eststo est8
207   ** with treatment control
208   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if type3==0
& round>2, r
209   eststo est9
210   ** no fixed effects
211   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if
type3==0 & round>2, r
212   eststo est10
213   **
214   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
Treatmenttype2 i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
215   eststo est11
216   
217   
218   
219   
220   
221   
222   ** generating correlation tables for various collections of variables:
223   
224   ** main variables of analysis
225   estpost correlate Treatment age female tie type2 anychange changesmade irrationalroundcount,
matrix
226   est store c1
227   
228   
229   **education w/ analysis vars
230   estpost correlate anychange female type2 math BCLA SOE CBA CSE CFA math, matrix
231   est store c2
232   
233   
234   ** race/ethnic with analysis vars
235   estpost correlate anychange female type2 white asian black hispanic natamerican raceother,
matrix
236   est store c3
237   
238   
239   ** character w/ analysis vars
240   estpost correlate anychange female type2 Wantchange Perfectionist Minval Detailorient, matrix
241   est store c4
242   
243   estpost correlate Treatment age female tie type2 anychange changesmade irrationalroundcount
BCLA SOE CBA CSE CFA math white asian black hispanic natamerican raceother Wantchange
Perfectionist Minval Detailorient, matrix
244   est store c5
245   
246   
247   ******* This next section lookst at the significance of various relevant other variables
248   ** testing for significance of race -- hispanic is the only one that appears to have an 
effect
249   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment asian i.
id if type3==0 & round>2, r
250   eststo rac1
251   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment white i.
id if type3==0 & round>2, r
252   eststo rac2
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253   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment black i.
id if type3==0 & round>2, r
254   eststo rac3
255   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment hispanic
i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
256   eststo rac4
257   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
natamerican i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
258   eststo rac5
259   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment asian
white black hispanic natamerican i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
260   eststo rac6
261   
262   
263   **** Now checking on the demographic questions for significance -- note that in none of 
these does the r2 value change
264   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if
type3==0 & round>2, r
265   eststo ast
266   **Insignificant
267   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
Risktaking i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
268   eststo ast1
269   **insignificant
270   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment Minval i
.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
271   eststo ast2
272   ** insignificant
273   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment Content
i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
274   eststo ast3
275   ** this one is significant -- check to see if relationship between Wantchange and type2?
276   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
Wantchange i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
277   eststo ast4
278   **this one is insignificant
279   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
Detailorient i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
280   eststo ast5
281   ** insignificant
282   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
Perfectionist i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
283   eststo ast6
284   **now all of them together -- risktaking is now significant
285   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
Risktaking Minval Content Wantchange Detailorient Perfectionist i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
286   eststo ast7
287   
288   
289   
290   
291   
292   
293   
294   ** now checking for significance of major/school -- once again, most dont change the r2
295   
296   ** making a new regression table that looks at school in which people reside with similar 
controls as before
297   
298   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if
type3==0 & round>2, r
299   eststo ist1
300   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment BCLA i.
id if type3==0 & round>2, r
301   eststo ist2
302   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment SOE i.id
if type3==0 & round>2, r
303   eststo ist3
304   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment SFTV i.
id if type3==0 & round>2, r
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305   eststo ist4
306   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment CBA i.id
if type3==0 & round>2, r
307   eststo ist5
308   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment CFA i.id
if type3==0 & round>2, r
309   eststo ist6
310   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment CSE i.id
if type3==0 & round>2, r
311   eststo ist7
312   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment math i.
id if type3==0 & round>2, r
313   eststo ist8
314   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment BCLA SOE
CBA CFA CSE i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
315   eststo ist9
316   
317   
318   
319   
320   
321   ** checking interaction with wantchange and type 2
322   gen wantchangetype2 = Wantchange*type2
323   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment
wantchangetype2 i.id if type3==0 & round>2, r
324   
325   
326   ** this regression looks at how different the regression is omitting an additional three 
rounds -- lost significance on earlyround but all other coefficients unaffected
327   probit anychange roundlost type2 tie tietype2 lateround earlyround female Treatment i.id if
type3==0 & round>5, r
328   
329   
330   ** exporting all my matrices
331   esttab matrix(utilitytreat1, fmt(%8.2g)) using utilitytreat1.xls, title(Average Expected
Utilities in Treatment 1) replace
332   esttab matrix(utilitytreat0, fmt(%8.2g)) using utilitytreat0.xls, title(Average Expected
Utilities in Treatment 2) replace
333   
334   esttab matrix(irraround1_pretreat, fmt(%8.2g)) using irraround1_pretreat.tex, title(
Irrational round frequency table for type 1 players prettreatement) replace
335   esttab matrix(irraround1_posttreat, fmt(%8.2g)) using irraround1_posttreat.tex, title(
Irrational round frequency table for type 1 players posttreatment) replace
336   esttab matrix(irraround2_pretreat, fmt(%8.2g)) using irraround2_pretreat.tex, title(
Irrational round frequency table for type 2 players pretreatment) replace
337   esttab matrix(irraround2_posttreat, fmt(%8.2g)) using irraround2_posttreat.tex, title(
Irrational round frequency table for type 2 players posttreatment) replace
338   
339   esttab c5 using corrmat5.xls, unstack not noobs compress replace
340   esttab c4 using corrmat4.tex, unstack not noobs compress replace
341   esttab c3 using corrmat3.tex, unstack not noobs compress replace
342   esttab c2 using corrmat2.tex, unstack not noobs compress replace
343   esttab c1 using corrmat1.tex, unstack not noobs compress replace
344   esttab esti1 esti2 esti3 esti4 esti5 esti6 esti7 esti8 esti9 esti10 using "Regression1.tex",
replace se scalars(chi2 p) r2
345   esttab esty1 esty2 esty3 esty4 esty5 esty6 esty7 esty8 esty9 esty10 using "Regression2.tex",
replace se scalars(F p) r2
346   esttab esta1 esta2 esta3 esta4 esta5 esta6 esta7 esta8 esta9 esta10 esta11 using
"Regression3.tex", replace se scalars(F p) r2
347   esttab est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 est7 est8 est9 est10 est11 using "Regression4.tex",
replace se scalars(chi2 p) pr2
348   esttab rac1 rac2 rac3 rac4 rac5 rac6 using "raceregressions.tex", replace se scalars(chi2 p)
pr2
349   esttab ast ast1 ast2 ast3 ast4 ast5 ast6 ast7 using "characterraceregs_appendix.tex",
replace se scalars(chi2 p) pr2
350   esttab ist1 ist2 ist3 ist4 ist5 ist6 ist7 ist8 ist9 using "majorregressions.tex", replace se
scalars(chi2 p) pr2
351   
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1   cap log close
2   *********Appendix B
3   *********Do-file 4: data recreation
4   
5   **** Cameron Bellamoroso
6   **** 8/30/2020
7   **** Senior Thesis
8   
9   **Due to an error in coding, data for round 34 had to be manually repopulated using log 
files from the experiment.
10   **This do-file automates whatever information can be derived from info from other rounds.
11   
12   
13   cd "D:\Work\Thesis\Data\Analysiscd"
14   log using Thesisdatareplace, replace
15   use Datarecovered, replace
16   
17   
18   **Data for round 34 was overwritten in the original document. the variables for the 
rankings (A-Q)Tier34, 
19   * roundpay34, activevar134, activevar234 were all manually brought in using the GSF file
20   * Further missing variables can be derived using these missing values
21   
22   * Repopulating the missing tier values
23   local a=1
24   foreach i in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q {
25   replace tier134=`i'Tier34 if activevar134==(10+50*`a')
26   
27   local a=`a'+1
28   }
29   local a=1
30   foreach i in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q {
31   replace tier234=`i'Tier34 if activevar234==(10+50*`a')
32   
33   local a=`a'+1
34   }
35   
36   
37   *populating the counts for round 34 using info on what was picked each round.
38   local a=1
39   foreach i in A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q {
40   replace `i'count34=`i'count33+1 if `i'count35==`i'count33+2 & missing(`i'count34)
41   replace `i'count34=`i'count33 if `i'count33==`i'count35 & missing(`i'count34)
42   replace `i'count34=`i'count33+1 if activevar234==(10+50*`a')|activevar134==(10+50*`a') &
missing(`i'count34)
43   replace `i'count34=`i'count33 if missing(`i'count34)
44   local a=`a'+1
45   }
46   
47   
48   
